Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id MAA04948 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 15 Feb 2000 12:27:47 GMT Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 11:17:01 GMT From: Soc Microlab 2 <A.Rousso@uea.ac.uk> Subject: Re: memetics-digest V1 #130 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Message-ID: <ECS10002151101A@imap.uea.ac.uk> Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Robin wrote:
[[[[[Is memetics really Dennett's theory of meaning? Can you give me a citati=
on on
that?
If Dennett really would stand on the claim that "intentionalities are
necessarily involved in memetics" then I'm sorry to have to say he's wron=
g. I
do know that he does not understand the difference between physical and
intentional information, because he said as much at the May 99 Cambridge
meeting, but given his work with Sue Blackmore, he should be familiar wit=
h the
argument as to the memetic nature of birdsong. Ah well, I guess maybe he=
's not
infallible after all.]]]]
. . . and by and large I agree with richard brodie's answers to him. You can't just say someone's "wrong" -
it's about as academic as taking your shirt off and dancing around a fire made by burning your opponent's
work. I retract my comment that memetics IS Dennett's theory of meaning (I didn't really mean that
anyway), but memetics is definitely an ineluctable part of Dennett's theory of meaning - and chapters 12-14
of Darwin's dangerous Idea should suffice as a citation for that (if the quote I gave you didn't).
The reason Dennett didn't want to talk about the difference between the physical instantiation of the
information on the paper and the intentional information thereupon, is because he realises that those kind
of arguments are going to get him no nearer to an understanding of mind, which is what he wants. If you're
looking for the importance of physical instantiation in memetics then I (and Dennett) think you're barking up
the wrong tree. It's the MEANING that gets copied, nothing else, and it's the meaning that makes the issue
important.
The physical instantiation is virtually irrelevant in the following context. I could write the word "Hi" in
candyfloss on the window, shout it from the rooftops, transmit it by e-mail, or carve it in stone on the face of
mount rushmore. What are the similarities of physical instantiation there? Who cares! when the answer to
the question of what is their similarity is staring us in the face - they all MEAN "Hi". That is what memetics is
about - it's about the transmission of meaning.
When Dennett says that he doesn't understand the difference between physical and intentional information
he's doing exactly what you ask - he's leaving it open as to the ontological properties of memetics, just in
case it is possible that there is some (physical or syntactic) transitivity between say, the instantiation of the
word "Hi" in my mind, and the word as written here in ascii on computer screen. He doesn't think that such
a thing is likely, but he's leaving it open, just like you ask. In the meantime the real deal as far as memetics
is concerned is as a theory of meaning, and hence its ontology should be in those terms.
As I say chapters 12-14 of Darwin's Dangerous Idea are probably the best explanation of Dennett's view on
this, but if you didn't have much time you could get an idea from the sub-chapter "could there be a science
of memetics?" pp. 352-360. This quote should count as evidence that Dennett thinks memetics is about
meaning: (from DDI p. 353-4)
"what is preserved and transmitted in cultural evolution is *information* - in a media-neutral,
language-neutral sense. Thus the meme is primarily a *semantic* classification, not a *syntactic*
classification that might be directly observable in "brain language" or natural language."
cheers, alex rousso.
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