CPM Report No.: 95-06
By: Huw David Dixon, and Steve
Wallis and Scott Moss
Date: 20 March 1995
This paper explores the implication of evolutionary models (replicator dynamics) in a simple Cournot duopoly model. A firm type is a linear decision rule in which the firm's output depends on the other firm's previous output. First we run an Axelrod Tournament between firm types. The champion firm is a near profit-maximiser. Second, we allow social evolution to occur using replicator dynamics. Here we find that there are very strong forces leading towards a collusive or near collusive outcome, so long as there is not too much "noise" in the dynamics.
Access as:
| Raw | Unix Compressed | Gzipped | Zipped | |
| axelrod.pdf | axelrod.pdf.Z | axelrod.pdf.gz | axelrod.pdf.zip | |
| A4 PS | axelrodA4.ps | axelrodA4.ps.Z | axelrodA4.ps.gz | axelrodA4.ps.zip |
| US PS | axelrodUS.ps | axelrodUS.ps.Z | axelrodUS.ps.gz | axelrodUS.ps.zip |
| SM Home | SW Home | Other CPM Reports | CPM home page |