RE: implied or inferred memes

Aaron Agassi (
Fri, 17 Sep 1999 17:00:33 -0400

From: "Aaron Agassi" <>
To: <>
Subject: RE: implied or inferred memes
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1999 17:00:33 -0400
In-Reply-To: <>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: []On Behalf
> Of
> Sent: Friday, September 17, 1999 4:41 PM
> To:
> Subject: Re: implied or inferred memes
> In a message dated 9/12/99 7:15:45 AM Central Daylight Time,
> writes:
> > Stated more abstractly, aren't there going to be situations in
> which we can
> > say that if Meme A and Meme B are transmitted, then Meme C
> will arise.
> Meme
> > C is not directly transmitted, but is an indirect consequence of the
> > transmittal of A and B.
> >
> As per Lakoff and Johnson in addition to Brodie. Meme A is metaphor, and
> Meme B functions to cause cognitive dissonance, and Meme C is a potential
> entailment of the metaphor -- Meme A -- that would resolve the cognitive
> dissonance created by Meme B. Then I would say that this is a simple
> memeplex.
> First of all Meme A is transmitted, if necessary. More likely
> than not the
> target already has Meme A - Meme A being part of the cultural environment
> which both the target and the vector inhabit. This probably
> being the case
> the first step would then be a suggestive cue that would activate the
> cognitive metaphor, though probably unrelated to Meme B. The
> next step would
> be the introduction of the cognitive dissonance -- Meme B (See
> Richard Brodie
> on this). Meme C is a relatively apt entailment of metaphor,
> Meme A, that
> would operate to resolve the cognitive dissonance created by Meme
> B. And of
> course this leap will be easy because the suggestive cue has already
> activated the cognitive metaphor, so it will have a particular
> readiness-to-fire that it wouldn't have without the cue (See Lakoff and
> Johnson -- "Philosophy in the Flesh" for references to empirical
> confirmation
> on this point). The target then spontaneously produces Meme C, believing
> (and really to some extent correctly) that they have thought it
> up themselves.
> Where the transmission of Meme C is a functional outcome, the target will
> most likely endorse Meme C more strongly because he/she "thought it up on
> their own" rather than being told so by somebody else.

Then memetic transmission is Dialectic?

>And then
> of course
> perhaps spread Meme A and Meme B, "because these were useful
> ideas in that
> person's thought processes." Meme A if it is part of the cultural
> environment
> will be strengthened in its position, or if not may get a
> foothold that it
> didn't have before. Meme B rather than being seen as a "negative
> problem"
> will be viewed as a "positive challenge." The truth of the
> matter would be,
> however, that the memeplex probably evolved in such a way that
> this is all a
> somewhat forced outcome. By triggering the target person's
> thought processes
> to engage them more directly the target becomes more likely to
> endorse and/or
> spread all three.
> I believe that some of the techniques which I have heard discussed in
> reference to NLP operate in similar ways, though someone a little more
> familiar with NLP could probably explain that better than I could.
> -Jake

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