RE: "More Real"

Gatherer, D. (
Thu, 08 Apr 1999 08:48:37 +0200

Date: Thu, 08 Apr 1999 08:48:37 +0200
From: "Gatherer, D. (Derek)" <>
Subject: RE: "More Real"
To: "''" <>

-----Original Message-----
From: []
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 1999 5:04 PM
Subject: "More Real"


It would be a principle of memetics that memes are entities
with a real material structure, wouldn't it? I think to question
that hypothesis would undo the endeavor completely.


I think that the strict Dawkins B school, ie. those that regard memes as
neural configurations, are the 'most' materialist in this sense.
Externalists (or rather anti-internalists) like me are also materialists in
that we see memes as having a real material structure when they are
artefacts etc. It becomes a bit more difficult when we are refering to
behaviours, as these may only have a transient manifestation. There is also
a variant of Dawkins B which is less materialist in that it sees memes as
not necessarily having any hard-wired neural structure but nevertheless
being 'in the head' in some sense.

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