Different cognitive representations of memes

Agner Fog (Agner@login.dknet.dk)
Thu, 06 Aug 1998 12:27:08 +0100

From: Agner@login.dknet.dk (Agner Fog)
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Different cognitive representations of memes
Date: Thu, 06 Aug 1998 12:27:08 +0100

In an interesting article Dan Sperber discusses the cognitive aspects of
memetics. There are different ways of believing a meme. Sperber distinguishes
between intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. It makes a difference whether
you intuitively believe something, whether you understand it, or whether you
don't understand it but nevertheless believes it because some authority has
told you. Sperber also stresses the imperfectness of communication, and that
some beliefs are more easy to memorize than others.

Dan Sperber: The epidemiology of beliefs. in: Colin Fraser and George Gaskell
(eds.): The social psychology study of widespread beliefs. Oxford: Clarendon
press 1990.

Can anybody point to other publications discussing the cognitive aspects of
memetics from psychological or similar points of view? This seems to be a
neglected aspect of memetics?


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