Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id MAA04766 (8.6.9/5.3[ref email@example.com] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from firstname.lastname@example.org); Thu, 31 Jan 2002 12:01:36 GMT Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2002 11:43:40 +0000 To: email@example.com Subject: Re: Abstractism Message-ID: <20020131114340.A517@ii01.org> References: <200201310107.g0V17Ls04883@mail12.bigmailbox.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <200201310107.g0V17Ls04883@mail12.bigmailbox.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.23i From: Robin Faichney <firstname.lastname@example.org> Sender: email@example.com Precedence: bulk Reply-To: firstname.lastname@example.org
On Wed, Jan 30, 2002 at 05:07:21PM -0800, Joe Dees wrote:
> > "Dace" <email@example.com> <firstname.lastname@example.org> Re: AbstractismDate: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 21:20:49 -0800
> >> >> >
> >> >> Representation is not found in the matter and energy per se, but in
> >> >their meaningful configuration. According to your formulation, since
> >> >everything in the universe is matter/energy, representation can exist
> >> >nowhere in it. Is this the position you are representing?
> >> >>>>
> >> >
> >> >Funny that you dismissed Robin Faichney when you're using
> >> >"representation" to mean exactly what he means by "information."
> >> >
> >> Actually, umm, no. For Robin, information does not have to be either
> >meaningful or representational. Representation is a forteriori meaningful,
> >as representation is itself a meaningful relation to that which the
> >trepresentation re-presents.
> >Robin claims information is contained in material "patterns." You claim
> >representation is contained in material "configurations." You're arguing
> >exactly the same thing, yet imagining you're having this thunderous debate.
> >You're not discoursing so much as butting heads to establish hierarchy.
> No, it is a central and fundamental disagreement; he sees no necessity for either a meanong-giving self or meaningful information in memetics...
My actual position, for those who are interested, is that culture can
in principle be studied without reference to meaning -- confined to
observing patterns of behaviour -- but the usefulness of doing so is
limited, and in practice -- and in particular where the study is part
of the culture (ie it's our own) -- it's extremely difficult. More at
Also, the types of information that are inherent in physical
structure and that are meaningful are very different. See
-- Robin Faichney "It is tempting to suppose that some concept of information could serve eventually to unify mind, matter, and meaning in a single theory," say Daniel Dennett and John Haugeland. The theory is here: http://www.ii01.org/
=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Jan 31 2002 - 12:10:05 GMT