Re: circular logic

From: Scott Chase (
Date: Fri Nov 30 2001 - 03:40:31 GMT

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    From: "Scott Chase" <>
    Subject: Re: circular logic
    Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 22:40:31 -0500
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    >From: Robin Faichney <>
    >Subject: Re: circular logic
    >Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 07:56:21 +0000
    >On Wed, Nov 28, 2001 at 06:52:43PM -0500, Scott Chase wrote:
    > >
    > > >> What would it be called if person B saw a set of wheels on person A's
    > > >car
    > > >> and thinking these wheels really "sweet" person B goes out and
    > > >a
    > > >> set just like them later inspiring person C to do the same (because
    > > >these
    > > >> wheels are really "sweet") and all of a sudden one sees virtually
    > > >car
    > > >> on the weekend cruise strip with these very same wheels? Is there
    > > >emulation
    > > >> or imitation involved here where one person is inspired by another to
    > > >buy
    > > >> the same set of wheels? Mimicry?
    > > >
    > > >Mimicry and emulation (assuming there's a difference) both involve
    > > >imitation.
    > > >
    > > You didn't answer my question though? Would the overt behavior whereby
    > > person sees wheels that someone else has placed on their car and that
    > >
    > > goes out and buys the same wheels and places them on their car be
    >Sorry, I thought it was obvious: yes.
    OK then :-)

    But where can we proceed from here? The overt behavior of buying a snazzy
    set of wheels has been mimicked, but would prying into the inner workings of
    the mindbrains of person A, person B and anybody else this behavior spreads
    to add any understanding to analysis of the situation? Would it matter what
    mnemons/engrams/L-memes were stored and how they were stored, reduplicated
    and mutated within the mindbrains of each subject, if this detailed sort of
    knowledge were even possible?

    There, in the post-Haeckelian days of developmental biology, was somewhat of
    a schism between evolutionary studies and developmental studies. Development
    was a "black box". Maybe, if the analogy suffices, internal workings of the
    mindbrain can be treated as a black box with regard to the subject matter of

    In this analogy the memory researchers are the developmental biologists
    honing their craft until such time that there can be a mature synthesis of
    fields. In this flawed (as they usually are) analogy one wants to avoid an
    immature synthesis, because it may lead to simplistic thinking such as that
    behind those who forced ill-conceived relations between ontogeny and
    phylogeny back in the Haeckelian days.

    Keep oil and water apart until they can be emulsified properly, lest one
    wind up eating a lousy sandwich. Perhaps the focus of studying culture
    should remain on culture and overt behavior. Of course this is coming from
    someone who is neither a cultural anthropologist nor a memory researcher.

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