Re: circular logic

From: Robin Faichney (
Date: Wed Nov 28 2001 - 10:49:19 GMT

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    Subject: Re: circular logic
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    On Tue, Nov 27, 2001 at 03:38:31PM -0500, Wade Smith wrote:
    > If all you mean by imitation is that wheels all look alike,
    > well, they don't.

    Of course there are differences but they all work on the same
    principle. That's what makes them wheels.

    > They are all circular though (the ones that
    > work), and if all you mean by imitation is that all wheels are
    > circular, well, of course they are. They're wheels.

    As you well know, there's more to a wheel than being circular. Only a
    small subset of circular things are wheels.

    > And if all
    > you mean by imitation is that designers working on a wheel
    > prototype have to draw a circle every time, well, I think the
    > circle is a little more basic to design then that.

    Designers not only have to draw a circle, they either have to start
    with the idea of a wheel, or they have to reinvent it. I say that
    in approximately 99.99% of cases (or more), they start with the idea,
    in other words they do not originate, but imitate. Can you deny that?

    Robin Faichney 
    "It is tempting to suppose that some concept of information could serve
    eventually to unify mind, matter, and meaning in a single theory," say
    Daniel Dennett and John Haugeland. The theory is here:

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