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On 26 Aug 2001, at 10:36, Dace wrote:
> Hi Chris.
> > > > Dace wrote:
> > > > > Bergson asks us to think of time in terms of a pond. There's
> > > > > no
> > > absolute
> > > > > separation between the surface of a pond and its depths. Yet
> > > > > we go
> > > around
> > > > > speaking of the "surface" and the "depths" as if they were two
> > > > > things.
> > > >
> > > > Surface - air-water interface.
> > > > Depths - below surface.
> > > >
> > > > Current - happening now, instantly part of the past.
> > > > Past - things that have happened.
> > > >
> > > > There is a difference between the past and the present
> > >
> > > And there's a difference between heads and tails. But the
> > > difference is only within the context of sameness. There's no gap
> > > separating the two sides of a coin, and it's the same with present
> > > and past. Like the
> > > time is singular. It's not composed of discrete elements. Our
> > > between present and past, between days and hours, is purely
> > > utilitarian.
> > > we didn't distinguish between heads and tails, flipping a coin
> > > would be meaningless. But that doesn't mean the disinction
> > > between them is
> > Uh-uh - H/T is an arbitrary assignment to two distinct sides of a
> > para-2D object. Now is the point where the past starts. You define
> > the surface as where the water stops, but it is more than that -
> > consider water striders (pond skaters) - they live their whole lives
> > at the interface, exploiting its properties.
> And simple, material objects skate along on the surface of time, while
> organisms such as ourselves encompass the depths as well.
Mountain ranges age like anything else does; we're just aware of it,
and of much else besides. It is highly unlikely that mice and
shrews, lacking self-conscious awareness, are aware of their
impending mortality, yet they live.
> > > - you can argue
> > > > that we're passing along the fourth dimension of space-time
> > > > thingy,
> > > > MR would be the index case of something from the past having
> > > > *any* existence in the present.
> > >
> > > If time is merely another dimension tacked onto the first three,
> > > then
> > > and future are akin to left and right, and "time travel" is
> > > perfectly plausible. If time is a kind of space in which we're
> > > constantly moving
> > > the same rate in the same direction, then going back to the past
> > > would simply entail stopping and reversing direction. In
> > > principle there's nothing to prevent this. This flawed view also
> > > implies absolute determinism, since everything has already
> > > happened. We can hop around
> > > see our future as well as our past. Yet, the very idea of a time
> > > implies a second kind of time, a continuous motion from the
> > > tourist's
> > > to the tourist's future. This is real time, the time that cannot
> > > be
> > > to a kind of extra-space. As Bergson pointed out, real time
> > > cannot be eliminated. "Sooner or later" we are forced to confront
> > > its inherent nature.
> > Personal time just implies that you can't stay still in this extra
> > dimension.
> What we think of as "subjective time" is our only direct means of
> knowing what time actually is, as opposed to the spatialized
> abstraction of the "fourth dimension."
Subjective time is exactly that: subjective, and not an accurate
measure. An hour flys by in a minute in the embrace of one's
significant other; a minute crawls by like an hour if one is walking
barefoot across hot asphalt.
> > Btw noone convinced me that we are not in a completely
> > deterministic universe (although I'm more or less on my own on that
> > one I think) - find me the outcome without a cause.
> By definition, an outcome is produced by a cause. If all you're
> looking for it outcomes, that's all you're going to find.
Positron-electron pairs that pop into and out of existence.
> If time is really just spacetime, then we do indeed inhabit a
> completely deterministic universe. But if time exists intrinsically,
> then it can be defined as the continual eruption of novelty into
Actually, no; the two issues are entirely separate. Spacetime
exists intrinsically to the fabric of the universe; we, on the other
hand, are a happy (for us, some of the time) accident, and the
spatiotemporal universe would continue on quite capably without us
here to view it.
> > > > This is a bigger question than development,
> > > > because you're positing the passage of information from the
> > > > past, direct. So are we talking about some undiscovered
> > > > continually existent store of info (so where do we start
> > > > looking), or are we talking about access to information direct
> > > > from the past?
> > >
> > > Where do we start looking for memory? This could take awhile,
> > > since
> time is
> > > a matter of when, not where.
> > Memory in us (you look in the brain btw) is almost certainly stored
> > the way it is in neural networks that have been trained. Neural
> > networks are inanimate and therefore can't be resonating, yet they
> > have memory.
> Physicalism eliminates memory as well as time (not to mention life,
> self, consciousness, experience, quality, etc.) If memory is the
> storage of information, then it's not really memory is it? The point
> of remembering something is that you don't have to look it up, either
> in your brain or anywhere else. Memory is when, not where.
This indicates a gross lack of understanding of neural net theory,
as well as the inseparability of the spatiotemporal manifold. Art
Bell might even object ot such a statement.
> > > > Books etc. don't count, because they are in the present as well
> > > > as the past (sort of a concrete version of option one in the
> > > > last paragraph).
> > >
> > > As material objects, books exist only in the present. If a book
> > > could
> > > in the past as well as the present, then it would still be at the
> > > factory and the bookstore as well as your hands while you read it.
> > Er, all my stuff, and me, existed in the past; you've lost me here.
> You switched "exist" with "existed." That's the whole point. Books
> existed in the past. They don't continue to exist in the past.
No, they continue their existence through the past into the present,
or rather, time passes while the existence of the books perdures.
> > > > Btw, to what extent do allegedly MR-influenced items refer
> > > > to the past, and to what extent to other contemporary instances
> > > > of the item?
> > >
> > > Morphic resonance works across time, not space. Non-contact
> > > effects
> > > space involve fields, whether morphic, electromagnetic, or
> > So what's going on with all these staring at the back of the head /
> > pet
> > + owner experiments if it's a time thing only? Has Sheldrake perhaps
> > cast his net a bit wide? Sort of Pauling in his vitamin C frenzy.
> Sheldrake is trying to demonstrate the existence of field effects
> among organisms.
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
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