Re: Logic

From: Dace (
Date: Mon Aug 06 2001 - 18:13:37 BST

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    Subject: Re: Logic
    Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2001 10:13:37 -0700
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    Hi Kenneth,

    You wrote:

    > Genes do indeed choose an underlying species- like memory bias to
    > produce our bodies instead of the numerous alternatives avaible, but
    > how does that similarity make us all different !?

    Every species has genes and proteins peculiar to it. In Sheldrake's theory,
    this enables the fertilized egg to "tune in" to the developmental pathway of
    its species. This is why the genomes of chimps and humans can be 99%
    similar, despite our immense differences. It's no different than a country
    station being right next to a rock station on the dial. It's not as if 98.7
    FM contains a code by which all the country songs are constructed while 98.9
    FM contains a code by which all the rock and roll songs are fabricated. DNA
    is just a tuning device. It takes only slight differences to yield a
    radically different organism. Beyond that, genetic differences serve to
    individuate the members of a species from each other.

    > That is, we are all the same beneath a collective species- like level
    > but we are all different because each of us is born in and by different
    > circumstances.

    Our individual differences result from three factors: 1. Genes. 2.
    Environment. 3. Self-determination.

    > The model you have outlined here, is by all means one I like, being a fan
    > of Sheldrake myself ( I started off upon this list with a thread about
    > but it seems you gonna ran into the same trouble I ran into, if you gonna
    > switch from the organic to the memetic memory mode .

    Mechanistic theory divides memory into two kinds. The body's memory is
    stored in genes, while the mind's memory is stored in the brain. In
    Sheldrake's model, memory is singular. Every organ, including the brain,
    remembers via resonance with similar organs from the past. The "mind" is
    thus the memory that keeps each organ functioning the way it always has
    before. Since the brain is attached to sense organs, the mind associated
    with the brain involves awareness alongside memory. Otherwise the mind of
    the brain is no different from the mind of the heart or the lungs or the
    pinky toes.

    > In the organic mode genes attract info from the genetic memory- pool
    > and they will make up your body accordingly.
    > But, if you attract info to ' become a better Catholic' from the memetic
    > memory- pool, IMO that info is not there as just Bio- platonic, but as
    > ' learned ' , as ' acquired' info. Or should it be that with the chosen
    > dition all of its possible and probable consequences were accounted for !?
    > That in the ( Memetic)Bio- Platonic concept all of the Ideals were
    > present !?

    There's only one memory pool, and it structures us from protein to brain.
    Bio-Platonism is a dead-end. If our bodies evolve, then our species-memory
    must evolve as well. There are no fixed, absolute forms coming down from on
    high to instruct our cells on how to behave.

    > IMO, I think we can/ must broader our view ans say, not only the fact
    > that you were brought up as a Catholic, would liable draw you into the
    > Catholic meme or not, but also the fact that your parents needs you to,
    > desires this, wishes that,...
    > If indeed, like Sheldrake and Waddington speculate that genetic traits
    > and habits and forms are like epigenetic- landscapes, why don 't we
    > have epimemetic- landscapes, like I speculate !?
    > Why is a form/ an organism reducible to its genetic parts and not to its
    > memetic parts !?
    > Why unites apparently morphic resonance only organic particles and
    > not memetic ones !?
    > And this makes no sense if we take Sheldrakes notion of an ' cumula-
    > tive influence ' serious.

    Waddington's model can certainly be applied to memes. The question is
    whether the epimemetic landscape is a function of genes or resonance. Are
    memes reducible to genes? Or are they the resonance of neural structures
    with previous, similar neural structures?

    Ted Dace

    This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
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