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Quoting TJ Olney <email@example.com>:
> Perhaps the difficulty is that there are many kinds of logic.
> The following represents one that Bateson labeled (for reasons
> I'd enjoy knowing), logic in Barbara.
> Men die.
> Grass dies.
> Men are grass.
> It is just as "logical" as the more common syllogistic form,
> but represents a different "kind" of logic.
> All men die.
> Socrates is a man.
> Socrates must die.
I would say the former is not logic at all, the latter,
of course, is.
Let's look at the first exhibition of `logic'. The first
premises are perfectly rational, but the conclusion is irrational.
Look at it symbolically:
We have the following perfectly logical premises:
1. Men -> die
2. Grass -> die
3. die NOT-> grass (:`death' does not lead to `grass')
Men -> grass
is valid iff
Men -> die -> grass
which is in contradiction with premise 3. Therefore `logic in
Barbara' is no logic at all. Well, at least your statement of
it. Please TJ don't smear such a nice name with pretentious
intent (my sister has the same name!).
The second one is trivially sound:
ALL elements of the set of men -> die
Socrates is an element of the set of men ->
Socrates -> dies
So having invalidated your first suggestion of logic, do you
have more in store for me? I'm a firm believer in a single
kind of logic (a real one, anyway). Wouldn't we have multiple
kinds of mathematics, if we had more versions of logic?
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