From: Ray Recchia (email@example.com)
Date: Sat 25 Jun 2005 - 16:53:54 GMT
At 02:59 PM 6/21/2005, you wrote:
>Ray Recchia wrote:
>>As I mentioned in the first part of this review, the central focuses of
>>"The Selfish Meme" is "meta-representations" and their transmission.
>>"Meta-representations" are abstractions, observations about objects in
>>the real world removed from specific objects and broadly applicable.
>>Being able to recognize something like "color" as a separate property of
>>an object and being able to recognize it in many objects would be an
>>example of a meta-representation.
>No - these are just ordinary representations.
>>"Representation systems" such as language and mathematics, allow humans
>>to replicate "meta-representations".
>No - these systems give meaning to representations. We meta-represent
>when we abstract information from its current representational system and
>re-represent it in another way. So "two" is a representation in the
>English language of a particular number. We meta-represent when we
>realise that we can also represent that number in different ways: "deux"
>(French language), 2 (Arabic numerals), II (Roman numerals), 10
>(binary). Meta-representations are representations of representations,
>thoughts about how things are represented, the movement of information
>from one representational system to another.
This is quite a bit different than what I took from the book (and I no
longer have it with me). What you now seem to be claiming is that a
meta-representation is a process rather than a thing. It the process of
comparing different representations in different representation systems and
modifying them based on those comparisons.
So then memetic reproduction would be the transfer of those processes?
What I took from your book was that a meta-representation was a higher
level representation that could be applied broadly to a number of a
objects. So for example, "blue" would be a meta-representation because it
was a property that applied to a number of different objects. Alex has not
only the ability to recognize "blue" and identify it, he can also recognize
the concept of "color", which I thought would have been a
meta-representation of a meta-representation.
>>This is all well and good, but I think that author Kate Distin goes too
>>far when she claims that humans are the only ones capable of
>See above for what I claim as (very probably) unique to humans.
>>By way of example, I offer Alex the grey parrot, studied for over twenty
>>years by Irene Maxine Pepperberg and summarized by her in "The Alex
>>Studies: Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of Grey Parrots", a 400
>>page work published in 1999. Pepperberg's experiments have been very
>>thorough, and it is clear from them that Alex understands the concepts of
>>"color", "number", "shape". "material" and "different". So for example
>>given a tray with two different colored objects on it, Alex will identify
>>that the difference between them is "color", as opposed to "shape" or
>>"material". Given a tray with a number of objects on it and asked
>>questions, Alex will report how many of each shape and each color, and
>>will total all of the objects.
>>Similar studies were conducted with chimpanzees, dolphins, and pigeons.
>>Animals such as these live in complex environments where the tasks of
>>daily living demand complex thinking. Being able to recognize different
>>colored objects and draw conclusions from experiences with those objects
>>is likely an important skill for a parrot.
>I have no problem with any of these examples. Indeed I have personal
>experience of rather terrifying German Shepherd dog who used to attack
>certain people only (but always) when they were wearing yellow. As a
>member of this exclusive circle myself, the example is burned in my memory.
>But, see above, "yellow" is a representation, not a
>meta-representation. What I claim as special to humans is our ability not
>just to identify a range of objects as yellow or round or wooden, but to
>think about those ways of identifying objects, and ask questions at a
>whole different level. Questions like: "I wonder how the dog represented
>this colour that I call 'yellow'? Did he see it as I see it - one colour
>amongst many that I can also identify - or did he not really 'represent'
>it, as such? Was there, rather, something about the way that this colour
>impacted upon his brain (damaged by abuse that he had suffered as a puppy,
>as it happens) which deranged him temporarily?" Questions like: "What is
>the French for 'yellow'?" or "What is the wavelength range of the colour
>that I call 'yellow', and is this the same wavelength range as the colour
>that you call 'jaune'?". Questions like "I wonder why the colour yellow
>is associated with cowardice?"
>I'm guessing that Alex would have struggled with these questions.
Alex would of course have a had a bit of trouble recognizing French, but
then so would I. He does though engage in self-reflection. When left
alone, he babbles to himself, combining the words he has in to different
I still think that you are underestimating the reasoning capacity of
animals. Let me give you another example: a rhesus monkey was observed
trying to climb a tree with very thorny bark. The monkey found some leaves
and wrapped them around its feet, and then made its climb. Clearly, the
monkey was doing some pretty complicated thinking there.
>>Another problem I have is Distin's instance that memes cannot be
>>transmitted through artifacts. According to Distin, when a person
>>"reverse engineers" an object or artifact, they haven't acquired a meme,
>>they've recreated it. Under such circumstances, says Distin, the person
>>has applied outside knowledge to re-discover anew the memes that created
>>the product. Distin does, however, view memes as actually passing
>>through symbolic artifacts. So under this viewpoint, a blueprint which
>>describes something, or a written work or musical score, would all be
>>methods by which memes actually reproduce. These items, like memes
>>themselves under her scheme, are representations and meta-representations
>>that stand for something other than themselves.
>>This leaves us with a memetics that would say that if Distin learned to
>>play "The Moonlight Sonata" from a written score, a meme would have
>>passed to her. If on the other hand, she learned by listening to a
>>recording of it, she would have "re-created" it. Somehow, I doubt
>>Beethoven would agree.
>>In fact, under Distin's model, imitation could not pass memes, because
>>the things being copied are not meta-representations, but the acts themselves.
>Again there's a misunderstanding of the meta-representation concept
>here. In my book I discuss different levels of imitation and how they
>apply to meme transmission. See especially pages 136-9, where I make use
>of the insights offered in Richard Byrne and Anne
>Russon's "Learning by imitation: a hierarchical approach", Behavioural and
>Brain Sciences 21(5):667-84, 1998.
Doesn't discernment through these advanced forms of imitation require
outside information? If it is going to be something other than rote
copying, doesn't there have to be another representation to compare to and
draw infererences from? And doesn't this run into exactly the same problem
you allege for copying of artifacts?
>>I think that Distin is guilty of some over-analogizing to genetics
>>here. In biology we have the sequence and the expression of the
>>sequence: two distinct things - nucleic acid and protein. Nucleic acids
>>reproduce by making direct copies of themselves: one strand serving as
>>the immediate template for another strand. DNA cannot copy the sequence
>>of a protein to make another DNA. In cultural evolution elements pass
>>through multiple forms: the representation in the head, the music played
>>on a CD, or the musical score written on paper. So long as the
>>information is translated from one form to the other, reproduction can be
>>said to have occurred. Distin claims that copying the manifestation is
>>different from copying the score because it requires outside information,
>>but I can hardly see how recognizing notes played on an instrument would
>>requiring any more outside information than recognizing them on a musical
>There is a need for reconstruction in listening to notes played on an
>instrument which is absent when you have the score in front of you. When
>you try to play music that you've heard, without access to the score, you
>have to infer information like "the music is in 6/8 time", "there's a
>crescendo here", "it changes key there", "these notes are quavers". If
>you have the music in front of you there's no inference needed: the
>information is given to you. Furthermore, the inferences you make when
>you're listening to it might not be quite right: maybe there's no
>crescendo marked there, it's just this musician's interpretation of the
>piece; perhaps the music is actually in 4/4 time, and these notes are
>Of course you'd need to be familiar with all of these concepts in order to
>make sense of the score, just as you would in order to reconstruct the
>piece having heard it - but the key difference betwen the two cases is
>that the score contains all of the information you need, whereas the heard
>version does not.
I disagree. Now, I only took piano lessons for a few months, but I
remember that I had to be careful about which finger to use to play a
certain note, so that I could reach the next set of notes with the right
set of fingers. The score doesn't tell me which fingers to use. Yes, an
experienced pianist knows this, but it certainly isn't contained in the score.
In fact, I would argue that there is actually more information contained in
the recording than in the score. A piece played exactly according to a
score can still sound wooden, while a piece played by an expert will have
enhancements about it that a discerning listener will be able to pick up on
and apply that they could never find in the score.
Here's another example:
This is the enabling language from a patent (actually one my brother was
the inventor of). It is the entire body of words that defines the legal
boundaries of the invention itself:
"What is claimed is:
1. A method of forming an interconnection comprising:
depositing a masking material over a first conductive region of an
integrated circuit substrate;
depositing a dielectric material over the masking material;
forming a via through the dielectric material to expose the masking material;
depositing a first photoimageable material in a portion of the via over the
exposed masking material such that the via is partially filled with the
first photoimageable material; after depositing said first photoimageable
material depositing a second photoimageable material and patterning said
second photoimageable material over the dielectric material defining an
area for a trench
after patterning the second photoimageable material, forming a trench in
the dielectric material over a portion of the via;
removing the first photoimageable material from the via;
extending the via through the masking material; and
depositing a conductive material in the via."
Could you make this invention now, or would you require some outside
>>An element in the chain can serve as both expression and
>>carrier. Evolution does not require a distinction between the two. RNA
>>substitutes for DNA in some primative organisms and experiments have
>>shown that RNA can perform many of the same functions as a
>>protein. Those same properties that give it more chemical reactivity
>>also make it less stable though, and so evolution has probably selected
>>for DNA over RNA as an information carrier because of that greater stability.
>>(probably more in part III)
>Again - thank you: I appreciate the feedback. I always suspect that
>misunderstandings on a reader's part must stem from a lack of clarity on
>the writer's part, so for that I must apologise. I hope that what I've
>written above succeeds in restating my views more clearly, not less!
You've left me with more questions. Which I suppose might go further to
demonstrate that the representation system itself does not always contain
all the information necessary to convey the underlying ideas. Or perhaps I
actually understood the ideas, and there were a few actual flaws there.
(Sorry for the delay in the response. Very busy at work)
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Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
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