From: Scott Chase (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Mon 16 Feb 2004 - 18:42:22 GMT
>From: John Wilkins <email@example.com>
>Subject: Re: Durkeim's take on the categories
>Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2004 12:53:56 +1100
>On Monday, February 16, 2004, at 11:58 AM, Scott Chase wrote:
>>This is a very preliminary view, but in reading through the first parts
>>of Durkheim's _The Elementary Forms of Religious Life_ (I have two
>>separate translations to go by), it seems that Durkheim is grounding
>>Kant's categories in the social realm, that is that categories of
>>thought are socially imposed upon us from without. This could be a
>>reversal of Kant's view in his _Prolegomena_ that we impose our laws
>>upon nature. For Durkheim, our laws would instead be imposed upon us
>>from collective representations that have been established through the
>>It would be interesting to compare Durkheim's views with those of Popper
>>in _Objective Knowledge_ where the categories would IIRC instead derive
>>from within via an evolutionary process of conjecture and refutation.
>>Popper's views would be much more aligned with those of evolutionary
>>psychology than Durkheim's would be.
>>Popper and ev psychers would say that Kant's a priori categories are an
>>evolutionary derived natural given, where Durkheim seems to be arguing
>>that they came from the social milieu.
>It is my understanding that this view, that the Kantian synthetic a prioria
>are the evolutionary post hoc traits of cognition, was first proposed (in a
>Nazi journal!) by Konrad Lorenz in 1941.
Yipes! Are you trying to set a Godwin's law record? One reply into the thread even...
Anyway, I suppose Lorenz (dark past and all) is an important consideration
as you point out. In short, I think I was trying to draw a contrast between
Durkhaeim and Popper using their tendencies toawrds social construction and
inatteness respectively. Lorenz was on the innateness/instintive side of the
coin and his brand of ethology was a precursor to ev psych.
One, could, I suppose look at science as a collective representation which
depends as an evolutionary process on Popper's conjecture/refutation method.
This mind meld might depart a tad from both Durkheim and Popper. One could
likewise try this approach with memes.
If memes are unleashed (contra the epigenetically biased/leashed
culturgens), how much do they differ from Durkheim's collective
representations (or "collective ideas" for that matter)?
Get some great ideas here for your sweetheart on Valentine's Day - and
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon 16 Feb 2004 - 18:54:09 GMT