Date: Wed 10 Sep 2003 - 01:44:44 GMT
Date sent: Tue, 09 Sep 2003 21:13:39 -0400
From: Ray Recchia <email@example.com>
Subject: Re: The Ontogenesis of the Gurwitschian
Part II Send reply to: firstname.lastname@example.org
> Just do a little more leg work and find out what developmental
> psychologists are doing perceptual experiments with infants. I suspect
> a couple of hours hunting with Google should give you some leads.
> Then write a nice note explaining that you are interested in
> discovering the least specific clues that a baby uses to distinguish
> the smile and sound of its mother's voice at different points during
> You posted all three parts of this at the beginning of August. The
> second one was the only one I could follow. As far as I can figure
> out you are looking to tie word meaning distinctions made by semiotics
> into some hard research on brain structures and their development.
> This and other postings have tweaked my curiosity enough that I might
> wade into the semiotic world for a look around at some point.
> Ray Recchia
As I have previously posted, I see the relation between semiotics and memetics, as philosophical doctrines concerned with the realm of meaning, as isomorphic to the relation between phenomenology and Piaget's genetic epistemology (philosophical doctrines concerned with the realm of being). In short, both phenomenology and semiotics are static, and provide 'shapshots' of mature perceptual (phen.) or cognitive (sem.) structures, while both genetetic epistemology and memetics are dynamic, and provide
'movies' of the development of perceptual (gen. epist.) structures and the dispersal of cognitive (mem.) structures. Together, these four disciplines seem to be interrelatable in a philosophical square characterized by the terms meaning, being, static and dynamic.
The Four Laws of Thought (if A then A, if not-A then not-A, Not both A and not-A, either A or not-A), the AEIO statements (all A is B, No A is B, Some A Is B, Some A is not B) in Aristotelian logic, and the Greimassian square of meaning (example: knowing how to be, knowing how to not be, not knowing how to be, not knowing how to not be, where wanting, showing, etc. may be substituted for knowing, what to, when to, where to, etc., may be substituted for how to, and do, say, make, etc., may be substituted for be) also describe similar squares. There seems to be a deep logic at work here underlying similar surface structures depicting the possible permutations of identity (Laws of Thought), relation (Aristotelian Logic), and signification (Greimassian Square).
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