From: Ray Recchia (email@example.com)
Date: Tue 17 Jun 2003 - 00:54:38 GMT
I think Richard's analysis here was excellent. I just wanted to add a few
Wade criticizes the "meme-in-the-mind" model because we can't be sure
that what is in one mind is the same as what is in another. However,
the "no two performances are the same" statement reveals that we can't
even say that two performance are the same. While approximation is
apparently fine in this context, for some reason Wade holds the "meme in
the mind" model to a higher standard.
In addition while Wade insists (incorrectly) that a meme in the mind
model does not account for variation introduced by outside factors, his
performance based model is unable to account to variation introduced by
inside factors. Because it is solely limited to an analysis of outside
factors, the performance model is unable recognize or analyze intentional
variation and subconscious recombination. If it attempts to it stumbles
on the same arguments about "how can we be sure of what goes on inside
the mind" that it uses to justify its own parameters.
Further, he requires a 'place where performer and observer are present
together', and thus if a person writes a book two hundred years ago and a
modern day reader learns something from it, Mr. Smith's model recognizes
no meme at all.
Strictly limiting memetic analysis to the parameters suggested by Mr.
Smith seems unnecessary. However the proof, as always, is in the
pudding. If some people feel the need to restrict their fact gathering
to the restricted definition Mr. Smith seems to think is required, I
would welcome seeing the results they come up with. However, despite his
extensive and continuous posting to this list, I doubt Wade will be doing
any of it.
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Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
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