Date: Sat 24 May 2003 - 03:13:52 GMT
> On Friday, May 23, 2003, at 08:50 PM, Joe wrote:
> > When you can show the effects of something, you can logically entail
> > that they have a cause.
> You can also logically, since cause is all you seek, call something an
> effect of divine intervention.
> And since there is an effect, a god must be the cause, for this model,
> and you are blind to the science of investigating.
Aww, C'MON!!! I am not suggesting anything supernatural but very much natural. The intenal is just as natural as the external, unless you subscribe to the Cartesian belief that the pineal gland hooks up the brain to the transcendent spheres.
> > But that is where Occam's Razor intervenes; real-world conditions
> > are thus left unexplained.
> Here's where I lose you. (Well, honestly, the whole type-token thingee
> is beyond me. I'll confess I don't understand it, and don't see where
> it impedes the performance model of cultural evolution, as I don't see
> where or how it matters to cultural evolution.)
> Real world conditions are not only explained in the performance model,
> it is the only model that allows for the fact that the real world
> actually plays any part in cultural evolution. It rains in the real
> world of the performance model. People fall in the real world of the
> performance model. Lightning strikes. Murders happen. Nails come
> undone. Ropes break. Things actually happen, and don't just get
> thought about.
> Or written or spoken about... in the same language... at the same
> time... in the same place... using the same map... to the same
> persons. To the cultural venue you enclose your example within, there
> is precious little difference in the expectation of the following
> performances from the observers of that which was written from that
> which was spoken, and the following performances is what matters, not
> the information supplied, and that bolsters my model, it does not
> quell it.
But speaking and writing are different performances that can, and ubiquitously do, communicate selfsame meanings (memes, in case you attempt to accuse me of not using the word). Of course, the idea that there are types that circumscribe tokens, just like there are common sets that circumscribe otherwise divergent subsets, is beyond you; you must keep such concepts beyond you, because once you understand them, your model is crumbled. The sentence "I think you're a willful fool" can be spoken or written (entirely different performances), but the person who can parse and read understands the selfsame message from either of them.
> - Wade
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
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