From: Reed Konsler (email@example.com)
Date: Thu 22 May 2003 - 18:26:25 GMT
<<Quibble quibble: if you can infer the existence of someone's rule, then there must be some kind of physical expression of it. Hence, it is not silent. That is why they call it a "tell".>>
Keith said a rule you never let anyone know about was not a meme. I remarked
it could be a meme even if you didn't let anyone know about it because they
might be able to infer it from observing your behavior. To me, the two are
not the same.
I think I agree with you. Are you saying that there is a difference between
intentionally trying to communicate a meme and unintentionally communicating
a meme? There is certianly a difference there, from my perspective, too. I
was just trying to say that there is a spectrum of behaviors from full-out
intentional envangelism to unitentional tells in poker. All of them are
expressions that allow me to infer there is a meme.
"I take the position that any thought, belief, attitude, opinion, or
learning I have may potentially affect my behavior in the future, and that
affect on my behavior might, however slightly, increase the probability of
that piece of mental information being replicated in another mind,
Therefore, any mental information is a potential meme."
Yeah, I agree. Maybe I misunderstood you initially. The addition of the
word "potential" to the description makes it much clearer for me.
Do you mean "any mental information is a potential meme" or: all mental
information is memes, any of which might potentially be replicated in
another mind. It seems you mean the latter, but you might be saying that
"thought, belief, attitude, opinion, or learning" is only a meme after or in the process of replication in another mind. Given all the conversation about performance and such I think the distinction is important.
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