Date: Tue 20 May 2003 - 03:50:20 GMT
> On Monday, May 19, 2003, at 08:21 PM, Joe wrote:
> > They may be modified (mutation),
> > and the mutations may be accepted or rejected (selection).
> From Wilkins we have-
> "Memes must be expressed in a cultural ecology in order to be
> selected, but it is the class of behaviours rather than the behaviours
> themselves that are memes."
> - and I would see this cultural ecology as the venue of the
> performance model, and the class of behavior within it as the meme,
> not, as Wilkins so aptly expresses, the behaviors themselves, which
> can, of course, be happening without a cultural ecology, but only
> within a social or biological ecology, and thus, are not memes, at
> Again, every and any model of memetics needs to show how the meme is
> active in cultural evolution, and, face it, the memeinthemind just
> ain't- it just sits there, absent of cultural ecology, and once a
> performer _becomes_ active, perhaps (but not necessarily) acting upon
> the "specific strings of meaning/significance that are learned" then
> the performance itself, the meme itself, will be capable of selection.
If it is intentional (and it has to be meaningful to be intended), it has to exist internally, as a type prior to the performance of a token of it, to be performed and subsequently selected.
> The memeinthemind model also has a high hurdle to jump to show that it
> is a _necessary_ condition for cultural evolution. IMHO, this is an
> impossible height for it and all that has been offered in the way of
> explanation for necessity is the equivocation of 'similarity' of
> information. Well, forget it- similarity is not isomorphism, at all.
> Ask that viceroy butterfly over there. And it certainly is not
> information transfer.
I've answered that question, both with my mention of a common mediating language that may be configured into novel meaning strings of mutually understood symbol-associations, and my caveat that the selfsame meme must configure in a similar, yet differing, manner with different yet similar (because human) cognitive gestalts in order to accommodate to and be assimilated by, that is, to adapt to, them. This is also a grounding for the type-token distinction, and why we can say, after observation, if we are familiar with the dance, that the short fat man is attempting to cha-cha, even though he may not be able to do it as well as the willowy woman.
> In the genetic model, the gene still needs to perform to be necessary
> to evolution, otherwise, it sits. In Keith's explanation of gene
> replication through coded transmission forms, we still can only
> construct a small portion of any living entity, not the entire entity
> itself, and can only use this replicated piece of DNA in small and
> insertive processes. Genome manipulation through chemical structure
> DNA manufacture is more an analog of memetic cultural venue
> manipulation than the other way around.
The gene does not disappear when it is not engaged in its job; many of our genes are dormant (recessive), yet they are genes nevertheless, and await only the proper conditions to activate. The same can be said about a memory I have that I've never told anyone about, until a friend mentions a similar experience.
> - Wade
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
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