Date: Sat 17 May 2003 - 22:18:09 GMT
> On Friday, May 16, 2003, at 09:05 PM, Chris wrote:
> > You mean that there is something in my brain, and your brain, that
> > is the same if we both saw the same thing?
> This is the core stratagem of the memeinthemind model, and-
> > Cos apart from on the most base
> > level of perception I'd have to part company with you.
> - it is precisely why I parted company from them, if indeed I ever did
> anything but have a few drinks at their parties.
> - Wade
Actually, this precise equivalence is a straw man; the selfsame meme would be encoded somewhat differently (although similarly, since the cognitive environment is in each case a human one) in different human brains, due to the requirement for it to accommodate to similar yet far from identical cognitive gestalts (the memes already there when it arrives). Peter can never be Paul, and neither can their brains contain contain the same memories and have elaborated through identical histories, so there is no requirement for Peter's neural encoding of meme X to be identical to Paul's encoding of meme X.
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
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