Date: Thu 15 May 2003 - 20:32:25 GMT
> On Thursday, May 15, 2003, at 03:31 PM, Joe wrote:
> > The mind is trained in associations between signs and referents
> > (this is basic semiotics), and a meaningfully patterned message
> > contains at least one sign that triggers a sign-referent association
> > in the recipient, and most likely, as in sentences such as these, a
> > semantically and syntactically ordered cascade of signs evoke an
> > ordered succession of sign-referent associations in the recipient,
> > each association a single pearl in a necklace of reasoning or a
> > single link in a chain, or train, of thought. The individual
> > sign-referent associations, having been previously learned, are
> > already cognitively present and available for signal stimulation,
> > but the order in which different associations are related may indeed
> > be unique and a genuine transferral of information, that is, an
> > understood sentence that someone has never heard or read before,
> > producing a never-before-ridden train of thought - like this one.
> I love the fact that in this entirely wonderful theory of cognitive
> semiotic process, the word 'meme' was never used.
> As it should not be. These wonderful processes of cognition do not
> need it. The only thing that requires a meme is cultural evolution.
Actually, once the semiotic associations have been learned, the subsequent transmission/reception of novel strings of sign/referent associations is indeed memetic. Semiotics provides the structural skeleton that is dynamically clothed by memetic processes.
> > This [pratfall], so far as I know, the ONLY possible example you
> > could give
> Alas, no, any aleatory element of the venue is also an example.
> Adaptation to the environment during the performance is just as vital
> and necessary a condition for memetic process as any intention. Thus,
> even the most well-rehearsed and motivated performance of even the
> simplest intentional idea can be mutated by the venue. The best laid
> plans of mice and men, after all.
But, most performances issue from plans previously cognitively laid, whether well or ill.
> > You either confuse habit with addiction and
> > neurosis or do not consider that people are often aware of their
> > habits and still choose or feel compelled to continue to indulge in
> > them.
> Here you abandon your previous argument, which was that all
> performances need to be intentional or meaningful. I do not confuse
> habit with addiction or neurosis, didn't mention either one of 'em,
> but you seem to confuse habit with intention, and that is not valid.
> If people want to indulge habits, that's fine and dandy. Culturally,
> in order to continue a habitual performance, it merely has to fit. And
> many habits, regardless of why they are indulged, can be useful to a
> culture. Habitual conditioning is a part of many learning processes,
> and culture uses as many processes as it can, as often as it can. Like
> life, culture finds a way. And it finds a way through performance, not
> through thinking about things. People are part of culture, and their
> training within the culture is just as varied and useful as it can be.
> Neurotics have a place and so do addicts, possibly, depending upon the
I never argued that ALL performances are intentional or meaningful, just that MOST performances are intended and meaning-motivated. You, OTOH, seem to be arguing that NO performances are intentional or meaningful; this position is, quite simply, false on its face.
> - Wade
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
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