Date: Thu 15 May 2003 - 00:08:01 GMT
> On Wednesday, May 14, 2003, at 07:01 PM, Joe wrote:
> > Meaning, quite simply, cannot be swept under a performatory rug, and
> > it is a fundamental confusion to mistake the encoding device (a
> > pattern of perceptual changes, such as speech-originated sound waves
> > encountering one's ears) for the cognitively authored significance
> > encoded in specific sound patterns.
> Meaning is not swept under any rug in the performance model- as a
> motivator of the performance it depends upon it, and upon the
> performer, and the venue, and the weather, and where the sun is, ad
Sorry, but it does not matter if you tell a timid person about a bear in the berry patch inside the house or outside in the garden, rain or shine; that person is unlikely to go berry-picking there the next day. However, tell the hunter the same thing, and he's likely to head right out there in the morning regardless of the weather or whether he was told about it inside or outside.
> What, in your example, gets _any_ meaning across? Why, gee, the
Actually, without meaning, there cannot exist _any_ specific performance, which is, after all, just acted-upon meaning/intention.
> What, in your example, supplies the meaning that is acted upon? Why,
> gee, 'the gestalt' of the observer and his following performance.
Nope, the 'cognitive gestalt of the recipient' includes all those memesinthemind that you attempt to motion behind the curtain (what makes the timid person timid and the hunter a hunter, and thus decides their differing responses to the selfsame meme). But Toto is pulling the curtain away and revealing that memesinthemotion is no great and powerful wizard-position. It's also no Jack Kennedy.
> Where do you not agree with me?
Everywhere you refuse to address the issue, preferring rather to delete my thought-experiment examples than to assay the uncomfortable task of dealing with them. I can repost them, if you would like; they are, after all, in the archives. Also, BTW, of course the selfsame thought is encoded in slighlt different fashions and positions in differing minds, for it must define itself and its identity/meaning in comparison and contrast with the rest of the unique (although similar) gestalt, or memeplexure, found in each individual mind. You claim that this is some weakness for cognitive memetics rather than just the way things are, then turn around and claim that every performance, even the thousandth swig of a beer, is nonrelationally unique, and claim that as a strength of you purported
'model', even though it renders type/token distinctions, and therefore meaning itself, impossible. How you've manages to wrap your mind around this blatant contradiction simply escapes me.
> - Wade
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
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