From: Wade T. Smith (email@example.com)
Date: Tue 04 Mar 2003 - 13:46:46 GMT
On Monday, March 3, 2003, at 09:19 PM, memetics-digest wrote:
> So, the question remains: where is the action observed at t1
> stored so it may be replicated at t3, if not internally?
The memory of the observation is stored in a brain. Are we arguing
that? I'm not.
But t3 is _not_ a replication of t1, nor is it t1, as you concur.
t3 is a performance, perhaps using the memory of t1, but not dependent
If a third person were to see t1 and t3, they might even say they were
the same. Such is the error of observation.
But such is also an agent of cultural transmission. If the similarity
is enjoyed, it might be continued.
But, there is no requirement, no necessity, to find t1 anywhere in the
brain of the t3 performer. Indeed, even though that third person who
sees t1 and t3 and calls them alike might want to think so (and might
even start a whole new pseudoscience based upon his contention), he
simply might have seen two similar performances arising from two
completely different memory/behavior sets, certainly two different
intentions. The comedian who performs a pratfall performs an identical
action to one who falls accidentally. Yes, they both have some similar
memories and skills, but intention and meaning are different, as are
performance spaces. Something that is more similar presents more
internal possibilities of similarity, of course, but, if one is to
attach similar meanings to similar actions, that is erroneous.
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