common selves

From: Wade T.Smith (
Date: Fri 01 Nov 2002 - 12:02:12 GMT

  • Next message: derek gatherer: "Re: Standard definition"

    On Friday, November 1, 2002, at 06:25 , wrote:

    > a common thought-basis
    > for instances of similar actions?

    The bemetic model assumes a similar common thought-basis (brain activity) for things like spider webs, language acquisition, artistic creation, etc. Where we catalog and define these processes might, perhaps, find things like meme-ories. It also assumes all the commonalities of speciation. In short, it assumes all that is here to see about the human being as a member of the life of this planet, if not this universe.

    It also assumes the complex homo sapien brain to house a self-referential emergent process. And, maybe we'll find the closet that's in, too. No tellin'.

    But regardless, how important is the self to cultural continuity?

    I would say a self is adamantly required to be a participant in culture, but, we still need at least two to tango.

    Are at least two selves, perhaps, at the top of the list of things that are really necessary for culture? You betcha. No self is a cultural island.

    What came first, the self, or culture? Are the two in some way part of the same process? (Could be. It's a substantial argument, I think if not self-evident. But not if one claims birds have culture.)

    - Wade

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