From: Wade T.Smith (email@example.com)
Date: Thu 31 Oct 2002 - 05:02:21 GMT
On Tuesday, October 29, 2002, at 04:32 , Philip Jonkers wrote:
> Losing one's temper is by far not always
> irrational (in the sense
> of being unexplainable in rational terms)
'Losing one's temper' would seem to me to be, by definition, irrational.
'Rising to anger for a cause', on the other hand, could be a rational
reaction to a situation, especially if conditions were prepared for.
But, providing motivation for actions is so sketchy and tentative, that
this complexity you speak of would seem insurmountable, at all times,
for almost any behavior. Which is why I think memetics needs to ignore
motivation. (I don't care if other things don't want to ignore it, nor
am I demanding that they don't....)
There is nothing behavioralist about a stance that admits of chance and
aleatory events, and nothing reductionist about the performance-only
hypothesis of cultural transmission.
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