Date: Thu 17 Oct 2002 - 01:30:04 GMT
> On Wednesday, October 16, 2002, at 07:43 , firstname.lastname@example.org
> > My argument is that by insisting upon the uniqueness of every
> > performance, so that no two performances cann be deemed to be
> > tokens of a single memetic type, you undermine linguistic definition
> > generally.
> The uniqueness of every performance is a given. I'm not insisting upon
> it, I'm recognizing it. This is an established aesthetic axiom as well
> as a physical fact of spacetime. And I _am_ saying that each
> performance can absolutely be precisely an attempt to replicate a
> single memetic experience. Each performance of Dvorak's Eighth
> Symphony is an attempt to utilize the memeplex (the symphony
> orchestra) that produces the noise that Dvorak described when he
> performed his meme and left his artifact of the score.
It is an attempt to recreate the eighth symphony which Dvorak mentally composed and physically wrote down, and if it can be recognized as a token of that type by someone familiar with other tokens of it, then it has been successfully replicated.
> But it is necessary to recognize that all performances are unique, and
> that this is another mutative function.
> My stance rejects the very idea of non-unique memes, because it
> recognizes the evidential certainty of unique performances.
So every smoked cigarette is unique, as is every quaffed beer, and, furthermore, so distinguishable and unassimilable that they are not tokens of beer-quaffing or cigarette-smoking memes? Hardly.
> In this way it mirrors genetics, as every mutation is a unique
> performance of DNA, from a set of similars. Coughs from the audience,
> squeaks from the reed, scrapings of the chair, if you will. Random,
> uncontrollable, unforeseeable, and yet, part of the performance,
> regardless of rehearsal or mental preparation or experience or even
The genome corresponds to the entire form of the individual; a gene within it corresponds to the repeated performance of a single meme, as it encodes a single characteristic, and not the totality of the template.
> > If you reject type/token distinctions
> > and similarities for all behaviors
> Ah, I don't think that I do.
> I only call some behaviors memes, not all behaviors, and those
> certainly contain "that subset of significative behaviors which we
> call communicative, that is, meaning-bearing, such as speaking,
> writing, signing, gesticulating, miming and all the rest."
> A meme is a significative cultural behavior, if you will, in the
> meme-is-behavior-only stance.
> Indeed, behavior is the only item we can investigate.
Actually, by not allowing the type/token distinction, which is crucial to the structure of semantic communication but anathema to your "every performance is a nonpareil" stance, you do indeed render meaningful language impossible, for lack of common referents.
> > We also need to decode the 'language of thought'
> We do, yes. The memetic models, I think, regardless of which one, help
> in that realm.
> I just say the behavior only model does it a little more neatly.
I can't see how, since it seems to have problems even admitting the causal efficacy of that thought.
> - Wade
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
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> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
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