From: Wade T.Smith (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Wed 16 Oct 2002 - 22:37:41 GMT
On Wednesday, October 16, 2002, at 05:28 , email@example.com wrote:
> what would be for one of them an
> instance of 'behaving' might well be an instance of something else for
> any others
Completely true in cultures, as well. (I could not grasp what seems to
be your main argument.)
> the kinds of behaviors that require the
> previous internalization of a neuronal excitation pattern
Any and all behaviors require this. How, in your model, can we find the
In 'something else' cultural situations, the meme would not be
replicated, as no-one would have any clue what it was or where it came
> The memetic performance of the song 'She's So Fine"
> subconsciously mutated in George Harrison's brain into the
> recognizable similar "My Sweet Lord"
I'm in no way denying the similarity. I am denying the identity, or the
meme-as-behavior-only model would. It is not that _a_ meme mutated, but
that a melody was repeated in the _next_ meme in the chain. Some of the
DNA was stolen, as an analog. Some of the parts of the transmission were
taken from a Cadillac factory and used in a Dodge factory.
> a doctrine of universal difference in the face of obvious and
> ubiquitous token/type class set similarity.
Unfortunately, I am not acquainted with token/type class sets, and
cannot answer or defend or contend your statement, but, I think it is a
false representation of my stance.
As is that.
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