Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id XAA00276 (8.6.9/5.3[ref firstname.lastname@example.org] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from email@example.com); Mon, 25 Feb 2002 23:10:22 GMT X-Originating-IP: [220.127.116.11] User-Agent: Microsoft-Outlook-Express-Macintosh-Edition/5.02.2022 Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2002 23:01:50 +0000 Subject: Re: mind From: Steve Drew <firstname.lastname@example.org> To: Jom-emit <email@example.com> Message-ID: <B8A0694C.firstname.lastname@example.org> Content-type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit X-OriginalArrivalTime: 25 Feb 2002 23:04:06.0781 (UTC) FILETIME=[B9D9E2D0:01C1BE50] Sender: email@example.com Precedence: bulk Reply-To: firstname.lastname@example.org
> Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2002 12:10:57 -0800
> From: "Dace" <email@example.com>
> Subject: Re: mind
> From: Steve Drew
>>>>> The point is that the mind, not the brain, imperfectly recalls the
>>>> I have only done very basic philosophy, but as i understood it the
>>>> mind/body duality has still not come up with an answer to the problem
>>>> of what happens to the 'mind' when the body does not exist. Further, if
>>>> mind is distinct from brain then how does something that has no
>>>> physical presence influence that which is physical. If it has a
>>>> presence where is it located - the pineal gland perhaps? :-)
>>> To attempt to reduce the mind to the brain is to imply duality. After
>>> you can't reduce tails to heads, can you? They're already the same
>>> thing-- just viewed from different perspectives.
>> I was under the impression that Descartes duality was the separation of
>> mind and body, hence my query. Duality refers to separate things not two
>> sides of the same coin.
> Which is why I'm not a Cartesian.
I was under the impression that the reason it was termed duality was due to
the problem of reconcilling two things that could not be reconcilled, in
this case the mind as some form of spirit or meta-physical entity and the
brain as a physical entity. I agree that you are not Cartesian.
>>> The mind is the brain's living history,
>>> both influencing it and being influenced by it. The brain is the mind's
>>> current spatiomaterialization. Two sides of the same coin.
>> This makes no sense to me i'm afraid. To me the brain and mind are
>> inseparable. There are no sides to look at.
> Let's say you flip a coin. It comes up heads. To avoid dualism, do you
> say, "Well, it came up headstails. I guess that means I winlose." That we
> can linguistically distinguish two things doesn't mean we're ontologically
> distinguishing them. That I refer to "mind" and "brain" doesn't mean I
> regard them as being separate.
Dualism to my point of view was the attempt to represent the same thing in
two ways that could not actually be connected, and so your definition is
incomprehensible to me. The nearest i can come to understanding is that you
see a coin that has two faces, while i see a coin with two faces. Its the
coin that is important
>>>> Secondly, not all habitual behaviours are memetic. Every so
>>>> often i find i have the need to eat. The only behavioural aspect is
>>>> where i will have lunch and what :-)
>>> Right. That you eat certain things at certain times and places is an
>>> example of your own personal habits. However, our shared, cultural
>>> habits do constrain your choices in these matters.
>> Not quite what i had in mind. What i meant that certain repetitive
>> behaviours are the same in any culture, such as eating sleeping etc. How
>> we go about them is cultural. But you would not term eating or sleeping as
>> memetic behaviours. Hence not all habitual bahaviours are not
>> necessarily memetic
> Memes, whether conceptual or behavioral, are bounded on one side by genes
> and on the other side by intentions.
as you know, i don't regard intentions as anything that has much relevance
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