Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id BAA27362 (8.6.9/5.3[ref firstname.lastname@example.org] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from email@example.com); Mon, 25 Feb 2002 01:08:49 GMT Message-Id: <firstname.lastname@example.org> X-Sender: email@example.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.0.2 Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2002 20:01:28 -0500 To: firstname.lastname@example.org From: Ray Recchia <email@example.com> Subject: Re: ality In-Reply-To: <002a01c1bd66$0d6ac720$5124f4d8@teddace> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: firstname.lastname@example.org Precedence: bulk Reply-To: email@example.com
At 11:04 AM 2/24/2002 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > >If, on the other hand, memories are stored in the brain, our
> > > > >recall should be as precise and accurate as a computer retrieving
> > > > >data. That our memories are reconstructed is a problem for the
> > > > >mechanistic view, not mine.
> > > >
> > > > So what was that you were saying?
> > >
> > >Okay, I'll explain it again. It's not that the brain's imperfection rules
> > >out the physical memory-trace hyothesis, but that a neural storage
> > >system should be comparable in accuracy to a cybernetic storage
> > >system. Since it's obviously not, this strongly suggests that the brain
> > >does not store memories.
> > >
> > >Got it?
> > Yeah it got. Same overgeneralization using different terms. Lets break
> > down the assumptions you are making to draw this conclusion.
> > 1) It isn't 'obviously not as accurate'. You haven't demonstrated that the
> > error rate for the neural system IS different from that of computers.
>Human memory is notoriously inaccurate. Computer data retrieval is not.
>Computer memory is not just vastly more accurate than our own but defines
>the standard of perfection against which human memory is found dismally
>wanting. To claim that I've neglected to properly demonstrate the
>inferiority of natural to artificial memory is like berating me for
>failing to postulate on the blueness of the sky.
I right I'll concede that you are probably right. But an actual
measurement of total information stored in the human mind vs. total number
of errors could show something different because of the sheer quantity of
information stored in the human brain (or wherever)
> > 2) Even if there were demonstrable differences it does not follow logically
> > that any data storage system necessarily is required to perform at certain
> > level of accuracy.
>Remember the top of this post? Here's what I said:
> > > > >That our memories are reconstructed is a problem for the
> > > > >mechanistic view, not mine.
>Nowhere have I stated that the imprecision of human memory somehow proves
>that it's not encoded in the brain. It's a *problem* for mechanistic
>theory, which must somehow account for the huge gap in fidelity. I
>brought it up, not because it's somehow at the very core of my entire
>worldview, but because someone claimed that the fidelity gap was a problem
>for my theory, and I was correcting that misunderstanding.
It isn't a problem for a 'mechanistic' theory(if that is what you want to
label it) though Ted. I would EXPECT that different mediums of storage
would have different accuracy rates. It's expected even for different
storage media in computers. You are wrong and your reasoning is wrong. And
the reason that I pointed it out is because when you can't even get
something this basic right it also stands to reason that the rest of your
thinking suffers from similar blind spots.
> > This point is a loser for you Ted. You continual beating of it does
> > nothing to enhance to enhance your position.
>You think I'm beating away at this? I could care less about this. You're
>beating this to death because you think it'll enable you to score some points
>against me, and it's not happening.
> > (And no this isn't a personal attack.
>Yes, it is. It's motivated by unconscious hostility towards anyone who dares
>to question your faith. Consciously you're fine and dandy, but there's a
>whole world underneath the surface, and if you don't tend to it, ugly
>things crop up.
Thank you Dr. Freud. I suspect that if I were in your position I might
adopt a position like that as defense mechanism. Rather than admit that
you wrong after all this effort you can just dismiss all those people who
disagree with you as having personal problems. You yourself have admitted
that you have been kicked out of news groups because you couldn't play
nice. Isn't that the 'usual course of things'? How many arguments of this
sort have you gotten into since you joined this list? How many have there
been before this? I wouldn't be surprised to learn you got that little
piece up there from something somebody told you at one point. From a
memetic standpoint you have a large emotional investment in your viewpoint
that makes it difficult for you adopt another one.
This is not even my main area of interest. I just want you out of here
because you alienate people with this junk and distracting from intelligent
discourse. I have been posting here for about three years. Look back
through the memetics server archive. How many of these types of arguments
have I been in? How many have you been in during the few months that you
have been here? Is that consistent with what you are saying?
> > >That we exist is self-evident only to me? Does that mean the rest of you
> > >are hallucinations? No, I think it's self-evident to all people that
> > >people do indeed exist. It's equally self-evident that terms like
> > >"experience," "thought," and "feeling" are physically and chemically
> > >meaningless. Thus we're not identical to our brains, which are, after
> > >all, physical objects, are they not? Finally, it's self-evident that
> > >minds don't exist without brains. So, where's the part that's not
> > >axiomatic?
> > Assumption 1 (people exist) is as much a part of the brain memory
> > hypothesis as the your time memory hypothesis
>Since the "self" has no meaning to physics and chemistry, it clearly
>doesn't exist if the mind is reduced to the brain. To give the mind equal
>ontological status is to make room for the person, the self, the me and the
>you. This is why Dennett and the Churchlands argue for the elimination of
>selfhood. It's simply incompatible with physicalist assumptions. Dennett
>may be completely batty-- arguing for his own nonexistence-- but at least
>he's willing to follow the logic of mechanism to its heartless conclusion.
> > Assumption 2 (experience, thought and feeling are physically and
> > chemically meaningless) is not a self-evident axiom and is in fact a major
> > difference between these two competing hypothesis.
>Have you ever met a physicist or geologist or meteorologist who referred to
>equations of "experience" or terrestrial samples of "emotion" or high
>altitude pockets of "desire?" I haven't. Everything comprising the world
>of human consciousness is meaningless to the physical sciences.
> > No one on this list server would agree with your making this an axiom.
>"Argument to consensus." You keep resorting to this fallacy, so I thought
>I'd look it up.
Let's skip it. I asked for self-evident axioms. If an axiom is
self-evident it ought to be something that people are in agreement on like
1+1=2. You are the one saying you don't need proof because your arguments
are 'a priori'. Now you are saying that your axioms don't need to be
things that everyone agrees on. And this is why this stuff doesn't float
here. Every system has axioms that just have to be assumed. If you want
everyone else to adopt your position then you will have to start with
things that people don't dispute. If they do dispute them then you will
have back and find more basic statements and work your way up from
there. If you can't then people won't be able to accept your 'a
>You know, sometimes when everyone is wrong, it's because they're all in
>thrall to the same mutant meme. This one goes by the name of materialism
>but is actually a form of idealism based around physics. In back of physics
>is math, not "material substance," an obsolete notion chucked long ago.
>Like a lot of pathological memes, it spreads by posing as its opposite, as
>if calling idealism "materialism" made it any less ethereal. It's adherents
>profess the most rigorous reductionism from abstract to concrete. Yet when
>it comes to brains and artifacts, they find all sorts of fanciful
>could only have been projected from human imagination.
As opposed to your self-evident time peering mind which uses the
imagination to see the obscure forms of the past. No fanciful properties
at work there all right. Just good old 'a priori' reasoning and deduction.
Yes I suppose you are right. Material substance is just illusion. When the
plane ran into the World Trade Center nothing actually happened. And when
the guy jumped out of the100th story floor the road below was just illusion
too. If only you had gotten to him first he wouldn't have died.
> > Finally it does not logically follow from 1(people exist) and 2
> > (experience, thought, and feeling are chemically meaningless) that
> > memory is retrieved from the form of the past by the mind using
> > imagination.
>That the brain facilitates the mind follows from the irreducibility of the
>combined with the fact that it has no existence without the brain. Neither
>identical to the brain nor separate from it. Kind of like heads and tails.
> > If two things are the same then they are both reducible to the same
> > elements. If the brain can be described in terms of neurons and the mind
> > is just another way of looking at it then if follows that mind must also be
> > able to be described in terms of neurons.
>The brain is no more reducible to neurons than the mind is to thoughts.
>To be organic is to be whole.
All right then. We'll start with the whole instead of the neurons. You
know that grey thing in your skull? Since that is the brain and since mind
and the mind are heads and tails of the same thing then the mind is the
grey thing in your skull too. If the grey thing isn't the mind but is
related to the mind, then you to explain how the grey stuff and the mind
are related. How do you have a physical object as tails that somehow
relates with this thing that has these time travel properties as heads. We
got these neurons doing all sorts of interesting stuff but no time
travel. What it is about the grey thing that allows this to happen?
I am certain that you can come up with an answer for this stuff but I
thought I would ask anyway. I mean you came with the 'it's dark back there
and all you can see is the forms using the imagination as light'
thing. Anyway if memories are the brain peering back in time then wouldn't
you have to be in the same place that the memories occurred in order to
recall them? If I had a time machine and I wanted to travel back to the
middle east in the 1700's wouldn't I have to start in the place where the
middle east was in the 1700's. You are saying that memories aren't stored
in the brain, they are stored in time. Does everyone have their section of
time attached to them that follows them around or how does that work? Also
why don't we recall what other people experience? If we can peer back in
time then why is it just restricted to our own experience? Isn't kind of a
strange coincidence that it corresponds to the information the mind
receives from the brain? Also, how does your hypothesis explain the
difference between long and short term memory? There is like a few minute
window where things are much more quickly recalled. How does that work?
This is about it for me. Because I stop responding don't assume I was
overwhelmed by your next response. I only have so much time to waste
beating my head on this. It really isn't my main area of interest anyway.
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