



## SSPoS @ Lorentz Center 2014

# Mechanisms for science: Lessons learned from modeling peer review

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# Peer review (PR) process

- PR is a cornerstone of science as it ultimately determines how the resources of the science system are allocated.
- Scrutinizes scientific contributions before they are made available to the community.
- Used in conferences, journals, granting agencies for project evaluations...
- As any social process, it should be evaluated with respect to a series of parameters [LiquidPub project]:
  - Efficiency, effectiveness, fairness, fraud detection, innovation promotion...

# State of the art

- Diffuse **dissatisfaction of scientists** towards the current mechanisms of peer review:
  - Famous papers initially rejected.
  - PR failures due to judgement bias and misconduct.
- Previous studies have found that:
  - PR includes a **strong “lottery” component**, independent of editor and referee integrity [Neff & Olden, 2006].
  - Numerical **evidence on the failures** of PR [Casati et al., 2011].
  - “Rational” scientist can **corrupt the PR mechanism** under certain circumstances [Turner & Hanel, 2010].
  - Rather low level of agreement [Bornmann, 2014].

# Aim of this research

- To **create a model** (better, a plurality of models) **of peer review** that takes into account recent theoretical developments in **recommender systems and reputation theories** and **test** the proposed innovations.
- **Today** I will ...
  - ... draw an overview of how we foresee such models.
  - ... present alternative implementations of them.

# Two opposing forces

- Simplify to the extreme:
  - Swarm intelligence.
  - Complex systems, economics.
  - Synchronous, interleaved, stepwise.
  - Failures by oversimplification.
- Make it as complex as you can:
  - Cognitive intelligence.
  - Philosophy, sociology, psychology, engineering
  - Asynchronous, concurrent, behavioral-driven.
  - Failures by overfitting and validation.

# A pragmatic standpoint

- Focus on mechanisms, thus dealing with:
  - Processes and algorithms.
  - Parameters and distributions.
- GECS - U. Brescia:
  - *A PR model with no name.*
- LABSS-ISTC-CNR:
  - PR-M.

# An ABM in NetLogo

- **Starting point:**
  - *Opening the Black-Box of Peer Review: An Agent-Based Model of Scientist Behaviour.* F. Squazzoni, C. Gandelli. JASSS. 2013.
  - Effect of **reciprocity** on the quality of PR.
- **Extensions:**
  - Reviewing behaviors: random, fair, unreliable and strategic (local competition vs. glass ceiling).
  - Author-referee matching policies: random, peer, higher-skilled and lower-skilled.

# Overview of the model

- **Entities and state variables:**
  - Scientists (resources & behavior).
  - Editorial policy (publication rate & matching).
- **Process overview and scheduling:**
  - Noisy production and evaluation.
  - Resource accumulation and expenses.
  - Evaluation bias, productivity loss & Gini index.
- **Submodels:**
  - **+16** extracted by combining reviewing behaviors with editorial matching policies.

# Two research questions


- What is the **impact of strategic behaviors** by referees on the quality and efficiency of PR?
- Which are the **effects of different editorial policies** to match referees and authors based on their academic status?



# Effects of cheating behaviours


Scenario	Evaluation bias	Productivity loss	Reviewing expenses
<b>Weak selection (75% published submissions)</b>			
Random behaviour	16.51 %	7.68 %	25.98 %
Cheating	20.07 %	4,91 %	21.34 %
<b>Medium-level selection (50% published submissions)</b>			
Random behaviour	25.27 %	14.98 %	30.77 %
Cheating	56.63 %	28.02 %	32.21 %
<b>Strong selection (25% published submissions)</b>			
Random behaviour	29.42 %	15.00 %	29.42 %
Cheating	70.86 %	34.72 %	35.24 %

# Effect of the matching policy



- Do editors have a silver bullet? An agent-based model of peer review. J.B. Cabotà, F. Grimaldo, F. Squazzoni. ECMS. 2014.

# Overview of the MAS in Jason



- **Paper intrinsic values** are integers in a N-values ordered scale, ranging from strong reject to enthusiastic accept.

# Entities

- **Papers:**
  - Object level: Any item subject to evaluation (e.g. papers, project proposals...).
  - Object value is **noisily** perceived.
- **Scientists:**
  - Writing and reviewing **skills** and **decisions**.
  - Strategic behaviours (e.g. rational cheating to eliminate competitors).
- **Conferences:**
  - Acceptance rate and policy (e.g. unanimity).
  - PC selection based on disagreement.

# Two research questions


- Can the PR system ensure quality in the face of variable reviewing skills or strategic behaviors, thanks to some **selection process of the PC** composition that leans on disagreement control?
- **Is the rational strategy really detrimental?** In which sense and under which circumstances?



# Experiments and Results


## Efficiency

Skill of reviewers




# Fairness (Type I errors)

Bad papers accepted



# Fairness (Type II errors)

Good papers rejected




# Experiments and Results

## Effectiveness

Conference	% Initial disagreements	% Final disagreements	% Disagreement reduction
National	18.25	-	-
Summer School	10.71	-	-
International	5.41	-	-
Intl. Core C	5.0	-	-
Intl. Core B	0.0	-	-
Hom-0%RC	4.3	2.9	32.6
Hom-10%RC	6.1	4.5	26.2
Hom-30%RC	11.9	5.6	52.9
Het-0%RC-LQ	4.7	3.6	23.4
Het-0%RC-MQ	3.4	1.7	50.0
Het-0%RC-HQ	4.2	3.8	9.5
Het-10%RC-LQ	9.4	4.2	55.3
Het-10%RC-MQ	8.6	5.5	36.1
Het-10%RC-HQ	5.2	2.4	53.9
Het-30%RC-LQ	46.0	11.8	74.4
Het-30%RC-MQ	16.0	6.1	61.9
Het-30%RC-HQ	3.9	2.8	28.2

- A simulation of disagreement for control of rational cheating in peer review. F. Grimaldo, M. Paolucci. Advances in Complex Systems. 2013.

# Effect of rational cheaters



- Mechanism change in a simulation of peer review: from junk support to elitism. M. Paolucci, F. Grimaldo. Scientometrics. 2014.

What then?

## Some conclusions

- PR outcomes are sensitive to how scientists **identify their competitors** (e.g. local competition reduces negative effects)
- **Editorial counteractions** to reduce the impact of referee misbehavior
  - Avoid peer matchings under local competition.
  - Select referees considering disagreements.
- PR and strategic behavior show a **complex interaction**:
  - It can cause a quality collapse or even a slight quality increase depending on the mechanisms.

# Ongoing and future work

- Ground model assumptions:
  - Game theoretical description and analysis.
  - Calibration from experiments.
- Adding networks:
  - Co-author, citation and behavioral networks.
  - Network dynamics.
- Data analysis and validation...

# New Frontiers of Peer Review

- Improve efficiency, transparency and accountability of PR
- **Kick-off meeting:** May 12<sup>th</sup>, 2014.
- **Working groups:**
  - Theory, analysis and models of PR.
  - Data sharing and testing:
    - Elsevier & Springer on board.
  - Research and implementation agenda.
- [http://www.cost.eu/domains\\_actions/TDP/Actions/TD1306](http://www.cost.eu/domains_actions/TDP/Actions/TD1306)



**Thank you!**

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Some more details...

# JaCaMo system overview

