D7.3:

Interim report

WP7 – Management

Populism and Civic Engagement

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Abstract

This deliverable presents the research progress of the PaCe project reported for the M12 to M24, D7.3 Interim report.

The report proceeds in five parts. The report starts with the project´s objectives and the reports attached to each objective released within the M12 and M24. The chapter 2 presents the overview of dissemination and exploitation plan and updating of the PEDR. The chapter 3 presents the updates of the Data Management Plan in line with the recommendations of the reviewers to the Mid-term review on March 2020. The chapter 4 presents the way the PaCE consortium has addressed the recommendations and comments of reviewers from different reports released for the first year of the project 2019 – 2020. The chapter 5 gives an overview of some deviation of tasks and actions from the original plan mentioned in the Grant Agreement.

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed in this document reflect only the authors' view and reflect in no way the European Commission's opinions.

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1. Objectives

1.1 Objectives

Objective 1. Trace the historical growth and political consequences for the EU project and democracy in MS of illiberal, nativist, and antidemocratic populist parties

Performance indicators due
– *Report containing the historical and political development of populism in Europe (1990-2020) (M24)*
– *Report on the state of modern-day populism in Europe (24)*
– *A typology of populist movements with development indicators for each type. (M27)*
– *A series of interactive infographics covering the causes and development of populism (1990-2020) (M26)*
– *Report targeting the public and other stakeholders containing tools (infographics and typology) to allow civil society to identify populist parties and populist narrative. (M27)*
The report on the state of modern-day populism in Europe has been delivered on time *(D1.2)*. The report containing the historical and political development of populism in Europe (D1.1) will be completed by the end of April 2021 due to a delay in appointing a key member of the WP1 team. Work on all other indicators is progressing well and no delays are foreseen. A database on populist parties cataloguing the different conditions, effects, causes etc. has been already built and is available for further research. In addition, three infographics have already been produced, and there are suggestions about another one or two. The existing infographics are available for viewing at www.popance.eu - bit.ly/39OvW52 and Twitter https://twitter.com/popandce/media .

Objective 2. Study the general and the specific causes of the three modes of populism (illiberal, nativist and anti-democratic) in European democracies – distinguishing between demand and supply side, internal and external causes.

Performance indicators
– *Report on the causal mechanisms of populist social movements and political parties in Europe. (M18)*
– *Report containing a theoretical model of the external and internal, supply and demand side causes of illiberal populism. (M22)*
– *Report on comparative findings and assessment of risk factors to democratic quality (M30)*
The first two reports have been delivered (available as D4.1 - bit.ly/2OskUuW and D4.2 - bit.ly/3rZgaKS). The third of these is future work.

Objective 3. Study, propose and test policy-oriented responses to each of the three forms of populism.

Performance indicators due
– *Report containing three case studies of political responses to a set of popular anxieties related to triggers of illiberal populism. (Case studies are included as a part of the report D1.1 – Historical and political development of populism in Europe due Jan2021)*
– *Report presenting containing an analysis of how populist party/movement organization shapes popular opinion and how populism and the opinions of populist activists and leaders shape negative perceptions. (M36)*

> – *Report containing policy recommendations on how to mitigate risk factors. (M36)*
> – *Scenarios and analysis of the steps to take to reach the desired futures and avoid the undesired future. (M36)*
> – *Report containing analysis of the effects of populist narratives in online experiments, analysis of the attenuate properties of counter-narratives in online experiments, policy recommendations on how to react to populist narratives (M36)*

These are future work, but will be based on D6.6, our strategy for Ethical, Legal and Societal Issues for policy recommendations in the PACE project which is already in draft form and being discussed.

Objective 4. Identify strategies for strengthening democratic values and practices, taking into account the role played by both traditional and social media and public opinion.

Performance indicators due
> – *Report containing policy recommendations on how to mitigate risk factors. (M36)*
> – *Scenarios and analysis of the steps to take to reach the desired futures and avoid the undesired future. (M36)*
> – *Report presenting containing an analysis of how populist party/movement organization shapes popular opinion and how populism and the opinions of populist activists and leaders shape negative perceptions. (M36)*

These are future work, but the foundations of these are already being worked upon.

Objective 5. Engage with stakeholders, especially groups under-represented in public affairs, particularly younger citizens, schools and local communities, in new forms of democratic engagement appropriate in our digital age.

Performance indicators due
> – *A programme of lab events (at least 10) taking place across at least 6-member states (M17-28)*
> – *A report with recommendations for new forms of public participation. (M28)*
> – *Circulation of project outputs to elected EU representatives and policy makers (M36)*
> – *D5.9 A final conference and gathering of youth representatives from the schools' project and country or European level policy makers to discuss the conclusions reached by young people through the exercise. (M36*

The program of Democracy Labs has started to be rolled out, despite a delay caused by the Coronavirus pandemic. The planned series of face-face meetings are obviously impossible at the moment, and so these have been moved online. We plan to learn through this experience so as to produce a package of advice to help others run similar online democracy Labs.

1.2 Explanation of the work carried per WP

WP1: Historical, Comparative & Scenario Analysis

The tracing and recording of the historical and political development of 18 populist and nativist parties (case studies) has been almost completed, and is accompanied by a comprehensive database of cases. Work is ongoing with: CLS on identifying key contextual factors with regards to the historical and political development of 4 populist and nativist parties, with PLUS on identifying key contextual factors with regards to the historical and political development of 4 populist and nativist parties and with TRI on tracing the historical and political development of two 'populist' social movements (QAnon and Gilets Jaunes).

A report with policy recommendations by Takis Pappas and Dimitris Skleparis, "Populism and Nativism in Modern-day Liberal Europe: An Assessment and Policy Recommendations," (D1.2 - bit.ly/39h71ac) has been submitted (January 2021).

A report on how to typologize populist and nativist parties is in the making and will be delivered according to schedule by 30 April 2020.

The data collected from the analysis of 18 populist and nativist parties in the last 30 years (D1.4) has been collected and, if the funds and technical expertise become available, there are thoughts of producing a dynamic infographic until the end of the project.

Three infographics have already been completed, to inform stakeholders on the distinction between Nativist and Populist parties, on the characteristics of populist charismatic leadership, and about how to distinguish Europe's various types of parties, including populist, nativist, and antidemocratic ones.

WP2: Simulation Analysis

In the initial phase, we were attempting to convert empirical probability into agent behaviour and find data sources that would allow us to devise input rules. Subsequently, the goal was to establish a reference model containing the interdependent behaviour patterns of voters and parties in Austria. Data from the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) from 2013 provide the primary reference framework because the subsequent elections in 2017 were significantly impacted by the rise of a populist party and its inclusion in government, major leadership change in one of the major parties, and the refugee crisis of 2016. Thus, by beginning with the previous election, we are able to establish a baseline for the model which can then be adapted to represent later developments. Being able to simulate the changes from 2013 to 2017 based on widely available data sources across countries (election data, issue salience data, party position data) should yield a reference model based on select input factors can be duplicated reasonably well in other cases.
Similarly, we draw on data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to situate the political parties in a positional space. To enable the reference model to work reliably, we include contextual information, such as changes in party leadership or different crises (e.g., economic downturns, mass migration). This way, we can establish "what-if"-scenarios that include both individual level as well as contextual data.

On the demand side (i.e., voters), we were able to apply individual-level voting strategies suggested by Lau et al. (2018) to the AUTNES data. By operationalizing the concepts underlying these strategies and matching the respective variables in the data set, we established five strategies used voters in the Austrian electorate: rational choice, confirmatory, fast and frugal, heuristic-based, and go with the gut.

On the supply side (i.e. parties) we started to allocate the Austrian parties to the ideal-type party strategies proposed by Muis and Scholte (2013): Sticker (Greens, Neos, BZÖ, Team Stronach), satisficer (at the moment no case in Austria), aggregator (SPÖ, ÖVP), and hunter (FPÖ). In a next step, we have been trying to transfer these strategies to the simulation and connect them to the voters' behavior as well as to the contextual influences.

Subsequently, we plan to map these principles from in the reference model to other country scenarios. This way, we allow for a more comprehensive understanding of spatial voters' and parties' behaviors. We make use of the development of case studies stemming from other work packages within the project, which help to transfer rules that are validated using our reference model to other electoral systems and other contexts.

Lau, Richard R, Mona S Kleinberg & Tessa M Ditonto (2018) Measuring Voter Decision Strategies in Political Behavior and Public Opinion Research. In: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82(S1), 911-936.

Muis, Jasper & Michel Scholte (2013) How to find the 'winning formula'? Conducting simulation experiments to grasp the tactical moves and fortunes of populist radical right parties. In: *Acta Politica* 48(1), 22-46.

WP3: Narrative Analysis & ICT Tools

Main goal for WP3 in M12-M24 was the filtering and optimisation of the retrieved data from the CommonCrawl database search including populist and nativist content. As mentioned in the M12 periodic report, the CommonCrawl search yielded millions of paragraphs with populist and nativist content, which needed to be coded for the extraction of single narratives and the development of empirical types as required in task T3.2. Based on the procedure used in informatics and computer linguistics when evaluating search algorithms, we used a confusion matrix to not only evaluate the single keyword results in the populist and non-populist data to filter potentially more relevant content to use for manual coding. This procedure is documented in the upcoming WP3 report, deliverable D3.1 - bit.ly/2QKi4Cx. The same procedure was also applied to the results from the nativist keyword search in the CommonCrawl data.

After narrowing down the retrieved potentially populist and nativist CommonCrawl data to 1000 paragraphs each, we used our previously developed extensive populist narrative codebook to manually code the content with a qualitative content analysis. We also developed and pretested a nativist narrative codebook to be able to code 1000 paragraphs of content with two coders.

After the coding procedure was completed, we developed a populist narrative typology which is also described in D3.1. The nativist typology is underway and will be completed soon.

Several conference submissions were completed within this time. Accepted papers include the CES 2020 conference (2 papers) and the ECREA 2020 conference (1 paper). Both conferences were postponed to 2021.

WP4: Causal, Policy & Futures Analysis

The work done within this WP advanced towards meeting several of its objectives, most notably that of 04.1 To study the general and the specific causes of populism in European democracies, but also 04.2, O4.3 and 04.5. Two deliverables, work on which was lead by the team of CLS and received substantive contributions from the team of PLUS, D4.1 Causal mechanisms of populism http://popandce.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/PaCE_D4.1_Causal-mechanisms-of-populism.pdf and D4.2 Theoretical model of causes of populism http://popandce.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/PaCE_D4.2_Theoretical-model-of-causes-of-populism_30Nov2020.pdf have already been submitted and are available to the academic community as well as the general public. The work on T4.3: Identify possible policy responses to address causes of illiberal

populism is also progressing and its results will be presented to PaCE partners by end of February 2021. The team of TRI has already started its research on T4.4 creation of scenarios and presented its first results in a PaCE work-in-progress online PaCE meeting in December 2020.

Some conclusions from PaCE's work on the causal mechanisms of populism in Europe and on the theoretical model of causes of populism.

Variety of causal factors play a role in mobilizing populist vote. Reductionist accounts, outlining a single factor (economic, cultural, political or psychological) cannot fully explain it. Economic factors do play a role, yet populist vote is not that of the worst off. Direct economic hardship indicators (poverty, low income, unemployment) do not distinguish populist voters from others in many countries. Such factors may more successfully explain the vote for radical right parties (nativist in PaCE), yet successful populist parties, which command majorities or near majorities in Europe, are not predicted by the vote of economically most vulnerable groups. Thu, the appeal of populist parties in Europe is not exclusively based on economic frustration. Further, the division between strictly economic and exclusively cultural explanations is often difficult to sustain as these explanations are substantively interlinked. Thus, the causal models of populism need to treat them simultaneously. For example, causal links between economic grievances and populist vote often rely on complex measures of economic frustration (such as relative deprivation, fears from globalization, loss of control, of status, etc.) and concern for one's group standing, thus gradually rendering economic factors as tightly linked with group identity/cultural concerns. Special attention was given to the role of political frustrations, which may prompt support for populist players even without economic or cultural grievances. Crucial for populist mobilization are psychological factors – another focus of our research on the causal mechanisms of populism. Such factors account for the ways´ populist leaders activate the widespread yet dormant populist attitudes in the electorate by transforming public frustrations and diverse fears into pro-active anger. Fueling pro-active emotions, such leaders successfully link individual and group frustrations, and manage to construct a new group identity - "we, the people".

D4.2 presented a theoretical model of causes of populism (*Fig. 1*), which presented the final results of the work on causes of populism within WP4. It started with an analysis of three types of factors - economic, cultural and political behind the 'crisis of representation' – which is identified as the general cause for the emergence of successful populist players both in Pappas (2019), and in D4.1 (PaCE 2020). On the basis of this analysis the theoretical model outlines two types of voters - ideological and strategic. While the ideological voters are motivated more by economic and cultural grievances, strategic voters are politically frustrated by the cartelized and consensus-oriented politics in a consolidated democracy. Charismatic populist leaders with their radicalism cater for both strategic and ideological voters. To the ideological group they promise to radically transform liberal democracy; to the strategic group they are a useful instrument to obtain greater concessions. Charismatic populist leaders are also skillful operators of public emotions, capable of transforming background anxieties into intense anger. The combination between crises, specific types of voters and the actions of the populist leaders ultimately leads to a successful populist project.

Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Causes of Populism (Source D4.2, PaCE)

WP5: Engagement & Dissemination
Local Democracy Labs (T5.5)

Facilitation Plan – The process design was executed by Demsoc in collaboration with the City of Reykjavik. It includes a facilitation plan for the local Democracy labs top share among local partners. The facilitation plan is a detailed outline for the European Democracy Labs in six countries and contains the objectives, questions, methodology, tools and script for the event.

Facilitators training - For the local facilitation team Demsoc in collaboration with the City of Reykjavik have designed and organized a training around running the local Democracy Lab in Iceland, discussing the script, practical matters and questions the facilitators had.

Dedicated website – For the first Democracy Lab in Iceland we created a dedicated website which contains all the relevant information for citizens to read about objectives, facilitators, setup and how to register.
Your Priorities Platform – Citizens Foundation in collaboration with the City of Reykjavik has developed an online platform for idea generation.

Project management – Recruitment of lead facilitator Iceland, managing recruitment of participants, overview and regular project meetings by both City of Reykjavik and Demsoc.

Ongoing dissemination activities and networking across Europe (T5.8)

Demsoc have been executing ongoing social media posts, several times a week on Twitter and highlights shared also on LinkedIn and Facebook. Apart from this research outcomes and results by researchers and partners have been captured for dissemination activities as mentioned in the PEDR and for reporting.

Demsoc in collaboration with the city of Reykjavik have created an outline for running online webinars with the objective to reach policymakers. The webinars are giving the stage for researchers to present their research findings, to connect informally to policymakers and have a dialogue with them and the public. These will be executed in the first half of 2021 Q2, Q3 & Q4..

Steps have been taken to establish PaCE's comprehensive digital footprint. This includes regular updates on the website and the usual social media channels i.e. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn. PaCE's blog has been highlighting key events, main findings and main challenges.

Various social media channels, such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and YouTube, disseminated PaCE results over the first year of PaCE's activity, with the aim to reach a broad audience and feed into the conversation around democracy, populism and other cross-cutting issues.

All partners are committed to increase the visibility of the social platform and will do so using social media and their institutional websites and networks, drawing visitors to relevant content on the site. The following table displays the current status of some of the dissemination tools:

Table 1. Status of PaCE dissemination

Instrument	Expected number of beneficiaries	Target	Current status M12-M24
Blog posts (6/year)	600	Policy makers, researchers from other projects educators, activists, regulators	22 blog posts shared via website and partners' newsletters, such as DemSoc (reach 2,000+)
Newsletters (4/year)	300	Policy makers, researchers	The first Newsletter has been sent out in May 2020 Number of subscribers: 64
Two short videos on YouTube (on impacts of populism, types or populism and responses to populism).	unpredictable (100s to 1000s),	the public (press release to announce the videos)	Statements and feedback of partners from the PaCE Local Democracy Lab in Messina, Italy available on the PaCE Youtube channel
Social media (twitter, Facebook	1000 visitors/users	public	**Twitter**: 419 followers; 158 tweets; impressions vary between 1,881-49.2 K (M12-M24) views on Tweets, 2887 profile visits. **Facebook**: 217 number of followers

A selection of dissemination activities carried out by the partners of the PaCE project:

Three infographics released in 2020:

1. The populist charismatic leader by Takis Pappas (published on the PaCE website on the following link: http://popandce.eu/wp-

Figure 2. Overview of the PaCE statis infographics

content/uploads/2021/01/PaCE_PopCharismatics_infographic_TPappas.pdf)

2. Populism versus nativism by Takis Pappas (published on the PaCE website on the following link: http://popandce.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Infographic1.v4.pdf)

3. A general infographic about the PaCE project by Roxana Cziker (published on the PaCE website on the following link: http://popandce.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/PaCE_general_infographic_140920_A4_WEB.pdf)

Takis Pappas (HU) as leader of the T5.4 Policy maker dissemination has proposed an outreach strategy.


Figure 3. Dissemination strategy for engagement of policy makers and other stakeholders

Academic conferences

- Martin Dolezal, University of Salzburg. Variants of Populism getting together? Matching Party and Voter Data in Populism Research. Participation to a Workshop/Seminar, Mittwochsrunde – Workshop. Paper Presentation, Salzburg, Austria. January, 8th 2020
- Reinhard Heinisch, Marco Fölsch, University of Salzburg. Measuring the Dimensions of Populism. Participation to a Workshop/Seminar Messung populistischer und extremistischer Einstellungen. Talk at official conference / workshop. Leipzig, Germany. November, 13th to 14th 2019. https://hait.tu-dresden.de/ext/veranstaltungen/veranstaltung-20689/
- Marco Fölsh, University of Salzburg. Dimensions of Populism. New Measures and New Data Participation to a Workshop/Seminar, Doctoral School "Internet & Democracy" – Workshop. Paper Presentation, Salzburg, Austria. November, 9th 2019
- Reinhard Heinisch, Marco Fölsch, University of Salzburg. Participation to a Workshop/Seminar. Paper presentation. Cologne, Germany. October, 22nd 2019.
- Reinhard Heinisch, University of Salzburg. Participation to a Conference. Talk at official conference / workshop. Adaptation and persistence - How the Freedom Party exemplifies the revolution of Radical Right Populism and thereby changed our understanding of it. Prague, Czech Republic. May, 27th to 28th 2019.
- Takis Pappas, "The Populist Playbook," paper presentation at the American Political Science Association (APSA) annual meeting, Washington, DC, 28 August – 2 September 2019
- Takis Pappas, "Populism and Democracy," invited talk in conference "Democracies in Peril," Tokyo, Japan, 12 October 2019
- Takis Pappas and Dimitris Skleparis, "When Nativist Parties Come into Power," paper accepted for the next American Political Science Association (APSA), San Francisco, 10-13 September 2020 (with D. Skleparis)
- **May 29-30, 2019** Ruzha Smilova presented a paper on "'Gender': a Nation Lost in Translation" (discussing the populist and nativist critiques against the so-called 'gender ideology' in Bulgaria), at *Visions for Democratic Future in Europe*, COST Action CA 16211 RECAST "Reappraising Intellectual Debates on Civic Rights and Democracy in Europe", second workshop of WG Debates, University of Bucharest, Romania.
- **July 5-6, 2019** Ruzha Smilova presented a paper on "Captured States and Populism" at the General Conference of the ECPR *Standing Group on Organised Crim*e, General Conference "Dismembering Organised Crime: Identifying, Analysing and Countering", University of Sofia.
- **September 20, 2019** Ruzha Smilova presented a paper on "Beyond the human rights movement?" (discussing the populist critiques against the international human rights movement)" at the *New forms of social and political mobilization: Reinventing democracy and civic rights?*, COST Action CA 16211 RECAST "Reappraising Intellectual Debates on Civic Rights and Democracy in Europe", second workshop of WG Practices, Central European University, Budapest.
- **December 5, 2019** Daniel Smilov leads a seminar series at the *Centre for Advanced Studies,* Sofia. On this occasion, research on populism in Bulgaria was the topic of discussion.
- **December 16, 2019** CLS co-organised OSCE-funded conference on *Political Representation and Public Financing.* An issue discussed at the conference was the impact of the rise of populism on the regulation of political finance.

- **January 2020** Daniel Smilov organized a seminar for doctoral students on the link between the rise of populism and the undermining of human rights in the 21st century, Legal Studies Department, Central European University, Budapest.
- **February 21-25, 2020**, Prague. Daniel Smilov presented his recent, PaCE-related research on populism at a seminar of the Russian *Institute of Law and Public Policy*.
- Participation to a Conference. Interdependence Summit 2020 Conference, Brussels, Belgium. 30th of January 2020.
- Nadja Nickel, Democratic Society. Innovative citizen engagement to counter populism. Ideas lab session at the European Public Communication Conference, Brussels, Belgium, 7th of October 2019.
- Participation to a Conference. Nationalism and Populism: Future of Europe. Brussels, Belgium. 5th of April 2019.
- Nadja Nickel. Increase awareness of the PaCE project and create networks. Soul of Europe Conference. Berlin, Germany. 13th of April 2019.
- Nadja Nickel. Increase awareness of the PaCE project and create networks. NATO Stratcom 2019 Conference. Riga, Ltvia. 12th of June 2019. https://2019.rigastratcomdialogue.org
- Namita Kambli. Presentation of PaCE project. EU Disinformation Lab. Brussels, Belgium. 28th to 29th of May 2019. https://www.disinfo.eu
- Namita Kambli. Presentation of the PaCE project. Conference "Cosmopolitanism in an age of global challenges". Brussels, Belgium. 20th of June 2019.
- Magnus Yngvi Josefsson. Reykjavik to participate in research on populism in Europe Communication - PaCE project. Article in newspaper. Promotion of the project. 7th of May 2019, Reykjavik, Iceland. https://reykjavik.is/frettir/400-milljon-krona-styrkur-til-rannsokna-uppgangi-populisma-i-evropu
- Magnus Yngvi Josefsson, Roxana Elena Cziker. Presentation of PaCE project to Better Reykjavik. Presentation of PaCE project. 28th of May 2019.
- Magnus Yngvi Josefsson, Roxana Elena Cziker. Presentation of PaCE project at the University of Iceland, Institute of Public Administration and Politics. 14th of June 201.
- Magnus Yngvi Josefsson. Specific PaCE related   Populism and Civic Engagement. Presentation to the Committee on democracy and human rights, Reykjavik, Iceland. 23rd of September 2018.
- Magnus Yngvi Josefsson. Specific PaCE related   Populism and Civic Engagement. Presentation on the Committee on democracy and human rights, Reykjavik, Iceland. 23rd of August 2019.
- Conference (June 2020) – Council of European studies: **Europe's Past, Present, and Future: Utopias and Dystopias.** Organisation of a panel on populism https://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/   The panel is organised by the PaCE partnership and straddles findings and presentations by projects funded by the EU H2020-SC6-GOVERNANCE-2018 call. It includes 5 presentations on the theme of populism and civic engagement.

Invited academic lectures
- Takis Pappas, "Answering 6 FAQs in the Study of Populism," invited talk at the Center for European Studies (CES), Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 5 September 2019
- Takis Pappas, "What We Know and What We Don't About Populism," invited lecture at the Institute of Sociology, University of Bern, Switzerland, 25 September 2019

Website, blogging

- Takis Pappas, Since November 2019, I have written and publicized **more than 50 posts** (totaling 45,000 words) related to the study of populism and democratic politics: www.pappaspopulism.com
- Daniel Smilov has a weekly column in the Bulgarian edition of dw.com (Deutsche Welle), which is reprinted by leading Bulgarian newspapers and electronic outlets.

Video/Education

- Takis Pappas, "What is populism and how does it rise," *TED-Ed* lesson accompanied by educational material, April 2020

Articles

- (2020) Daniel Smilov, "Efficiency, Authority and Representation" in eds. Steven Blockmans and Sophia Russack, *Deliberative Democracy in the EU: Countering Populism with Participation and Debate,* CEPS, Brussels and Rowman & Littlefield International, London https://www.sipotra.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Deliberative-Democracy-in-the-EU.-Countering-Populism-with-Participation-and-Debate.pdf
- (2020) Daniel Smilov, Power, Suffering and Compassion, (Journal of the Bulgarian Association of Political Science), бр 1-2.
- (2019) Daniel Smilov, *"Populism as Anti-Paternalism"* in Comparative Constitutional Review No3(130) 2019 (in Russian).
- (2019) Daniel Smilov, "Bulgaria: More Europe in Domestic Politics" in Michael Kaeding, Johannes Pollak, Paul Schmidt (eds.) *The Future of Europe,* Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- (2019) Daniel Smilov, "Human Rights in the Age of Anti-Paternalism" in Tobor Varady and Miodrag Jovanovich (eds.) *Human Rights in the 21st Century,* Eleven International Publishing, Netherlands.

(2019) European Democracy: Anti-Paternalism or Solidarity in European Values: New Constellation.

WP6: Ethics

The PaCE Ethics handbook continues to be updated, providing guidance for project members. All ethical clearances have now been obtained and are kept in the PaCE repository.

In M12-24 the following work was conducted under WP6
Following the M12 review, the project's ethics handbook D6.1 was revised and resubmitted to EC. The revision in May 2020 expanded ethics information on tasks that were under-detailed in the first version of the handbook and where there was now more detailed information available. A subsequent update in July 2020 provided a further update on T3.5 at the request of the Project Officer.

As part of Task 6.2- Ethical monitoring, TRI led individual discussions with every other consortium partner to discuss the ethics issues potentially associated with their respective work, identify needed support from WP6, and to monitor the status of their ethics approval applications (where necessary). Detailed support was provided to the team planning the Democracy labs in WP5, particularly in relation to the recruitment of participants, appropriate informed consent procedures and data protection considerations. As reported below, the situation is as follows: CLS complete (15th of Jan2020); DemSoc complete (August 2019); HU complete (22nd of May 2020);

TUD is still in process; TRI complete (28th of May 2020); CF complete)5th of June 2020); RVK complete (31st of august 2020); The updated version of the D8.2 opinions/approval of ethics committees has been submitted to the EC portal on the 30th of June 2020. TRI will continue to support TUD in their application as they come closer to the relevant task (the TUD ethics board has stated that it will consider the application closer to the activity – planned for early 2021).

Under Task 6.6, a substantially complete version of the D6.6 – Ethical, Legal and Societal Issues guidance on the policy recommendations - has been researched and prepared. Whilst this report is formally due at the end of the project, bringing it earlier allows it to better inform the policy recommendations work in WP4 and WP5. This report first restates the context for its ELSI deliverables, including revisiting the explicit ethical commitments already made by the project. We then examine the general ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) at play in providing policy recommendations from research activity, as applied to the PACE project. We then specifically address the ELSI challenges that arise from producing policy recommendations in the highly politicised environment of populism research. The report concludes with a summary of the internal recommendations for the project. This draft has been presented to the consortium and will be revised based upon their feedback.

WP7: Management

Table 2. Risk assessment procedure for Local Democracy Labs

Risk	Risk description	Risk owner	Impact	Likeli hood	Mitigation
Lack of information on the project´s aim and purpose	The research subject is not informed about the project 's aims and purposes and so not able to make an informed decision on participation and contribution	RVK	Medium	Low	Research subject is provided with an informed consent form that contains detailed information about the aim and purpose of the project and the use of data.
Anonymity of research subjects	Guaranteeing the anonymity of the research subjects	RVK	High	Low	The anonymity of the research subject is guaranteed at all times through anonymisation and pseudoanonymisation procedures. Only anonymized data will be used for processing and analysis. This data will be uploaded to a shared server for use of the project partners. Planned data repositories and publicly available information will only use aggregate data that cannot be attributed to particular individuals (neither by rank or function).

Risk	Risk description	Risk owner	Impact	Likeli hood	Mitigation
Personal data protection	Ensuring the safekeeping of all personal data both during and after the project	RVK	High	Low	All partners but Trilateral have appointed a data protection officer or have in place robust data protection procedures as required by the grant provider and all have contributed and agreed a data management plan. All data handling procedures are in full compliance with the European Data Protection Regulation and European best practices including FAIR data management principles and EU guidance on ethics and data protection. Trilateral has in place a detailed data protection policy.
Processing of sensitive data	Ensuring the safe processing of personal date	RVK	High	Low	All data are anonymised or pseudoanonymised and will be safely stored in a GDPR certified repository for long term preservation and curation. Only anonymized data will be used for processing and analysis. This data will be uploaded to a shared server for use of the project partners. Planned data repositories and publicly available information will only use aggregate data that cannot be attributed to particular individuals (neither by rank or function).Where the analyses of anonymised or pseudonymised empirical research data will be published, the consortium will publish them in the scientific journals and further an open access will be provided on the PaCE webpage and on the mass media related PaCE, as claimed as part of the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. After the duration of data process period expires (five years after the project's last payment) or the informed consent has been revoked (the earlier applies), all personal and sensitive data has to be deleted from the databases of the consortium.
Data storage	Ensuring the safekeeping of personal data	RVK	High	Low	The data collected will then be anonymized and converted to electronic form and stored on computers (and storage devices) under the control of project team leader. Back-up storage devices will remain in a locked department safe with access only for the PaCE project leader. The research data is stored on servers at the Technical University of Desden (TUD) for 5 years after the completion of the project. TUD is in full compliance with the GDPR.

Risk	Risk description	Risk owner	Impact	Likeli hood	Mitigation
Right to be forgotten	Ensuring that the research subject retains the right to withdraw from the research and that the subject can withdraw contributions at any time during and after the project	RVK	High	Low	The research subject will be asked to sign an informed consent form that will stipulate the withdrawal procedure should the research subject wish to withdraw their participation in the project. It will also explain the research subjects right to be forgotten
Risk of harm (physical, psychological, economic, legal)	The risk concerns any threats or intimidating behaviours that participants in the projects may experience in the course of carrying out research activities	RVK	Medium	Low	All research participants will be informed that threatening and intimidating behaviour will not be tolerated and will lead to termination of participation
Informed consent	Ensuring that the research subject consents to participate and contribute to the research based on a sound understanding of the project and the use of findings	RVK	High	Low	The consent procedure is an important aspect to participate in the research. PaCE researchers will ensure that the potential participant, or her/his legal representative is fully informed about the aim and purpose of the PaCE project and the local democracy labs. before giving their consent, research subjects will be informed of the aims, scope and expected results including how the data will be used.
Data acquisition and use of data	Concerns what will be collected and how and how it will be analysed and used	RVK	High	Low	Expected tools for data acquisition will consist of surveys, questionnaires, interviews and focus groups. The data subject will be provided with detailed information about the envisaged data processing and data usage in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language

Risk	Risk description	Risk owner	Impact	Likeli hood	Mitigation
Vulnerable population / minors		RVK	Medium	Low	Partners conducting activities involving minors (age range 16-18 years old) will obtain the consent of a parent/legal representative as well as the assent of the child and provide information to him/her in a language that he/she may understand. The Ethics Handbook provides additional details on the involvement of minors in the PaCE project and the way they will be protected.
Sampling	Proportionate representation of different types of participants	RVK	Medium	Low	Participation in research activities is voluntary. Recruitment will happen through local networks, social media, mainstream media, and other means that may be specific to the region. All activities will only include adults only that will be in a position to understand their role in the project and the conditions of their participation including their right to withdraw their participation and data at any time during and after the project. There will be no need for personal information apart from basis demographic information that will be anonymised and securely stored. Recruitment will be purposive and voluntary but guided by considerations of gender equality, the inclusion on minority groups and best practices of social inclusion including gender, age, ethnic background, physical disability, political affiliations, sexual orientation and other factors that could discriminate against a social group. All potential participants shall be informed of the purpose of the project in terms and language that a non-expert can understand.
Framing bias	Managing potential framing bias, the researchers may have concerning	RVK	High	Low	All PacE researchers are briefed and are aware of potential biases including their own political views and the risk of selective sampling and the importance of non-judgemental political positioning
Conflict moderation	Handing conflict between participants	RVK	Medium	Low	The PaCE research has a duty of care towards all research participants and will at all times strive to maintain a socially constructive dynamic in the labs. The researchers will act to moderate and steer discussions away from harmful or abusive topics

Risk	Risk description	Risk owner	Impact	Likeli hood	Mitigation
Follow up and information	Informing participants after the events	RVK	Low	Low	All participants will receive an offer to be provided with updates on the research either via mailing list subscription or through invitations on to online and offline project events
Follow up and support	Supporting participants after the events	RVK	Low	Low	All participants will receive an offer for support after the event

2. Update of the plan for exploitation and dissemination of results

The Plan of Exploitation and Dissemination of Results (PEDR) has been updated as following:
- A tri-consortia online workshop, a collaboration of PaCE, POPREBEL, and DEMOS project, proposed by RVK (plan to be organized in February 2021)
- Horizon Results Booster, a joint consortia dissemination and exploitation strategy in collaboration with POPREBEL and DEMOS projects, a proposal of ICONS company that supports researchers and EU-funded projects in creating an impact on society improving awareness, engagement, social acceptance, uptake, or research results.
- An active dissemination and exploitation strategy, creating a public space of sharing the research outcomes of the PaCE project: a series of webinars will be planned during 2021 with different stakeholders and policymakers, experts across Europe. The webinars will be carried out during 2021, led by DemSoc, with the partners´ contribution.
- A strategy for the T5.4 Policymaker dissemination has been created: a list with forums, an organization aiming the policy recommendations debate has been created.

3. Update of the data management plan

The DMP has been updated in line with the recommendations of the reviewers with the occasion of the Mid-term review in March 2020:
- Type of the data collected/generated and processed providing information about the degree of privacy and confidentiality of the data
- Applied methodology and standards for collecting/generating of data sets
- Data management during and after the end of the project
- Data quality assessment, data labelling and data cleansing methods
- Sharing and open access to the PaCE project data
- Curation and preservation methods of data (including after the end of the project)

Measures that are foreseen for the adequate management of the data from the ethical and security points of view.

4. Follow-up of recommendations and comments from previous review

The following recommendations emerged after the mid-term review in March 2020:

- **24.04.2020** – Requirement of changes in the financial report – MMU – reported PM on WP8 even if these costs were not included into the GA; CLS real costs; DemSoc, exceed the reported PM for WP6 and WP7 which is not in line with the annex 1-part A of the GA; TRI IE reported PM on WP3, WP5 and WP7 which is not in line with the GA; Citizens Foundation – declare real costs with decimals.
  - o **How has been addressed**: the project coordinator and research project management have been in contact with the project responsible in each country and the justifications and budget adjustment have been applied in the financial reports.
  - o **12.05.2020** – Rejection of Project Handbook – appointment of a quality manager, progress of the Key Performance.
  - o **How has been addressed**: the quality manager has been assigned for the PaCE project (Roxana Elena Cziker, RVK); the Key performances have been updated with the contribution of DemSoc, the leader of WP5 Dissemination and Engagement. The reviewed D7.1 has been submitted to the EC portal on the 30th of June 2020.
- **04.06.2020** – Revision of the Data Management Plan
  - o **How has been addressed**: the RVK Iceland has contacted the leaders of work packages and collect the necessary data for completing the DMP: *type of the data, secondary data, the target group, personal data and data protection, sampling methods, data origin, data format, data objectives, data scale, data quality assessment, data cleansing, data labelling / coding, accessibility and distribution of data, interoperability of data.* The updated version of the DMP has been submitted to the EC portal on 30th of June 2020.
- **12.05.2020** – Copies of approvals by ethics committees for the research with humans.
  - o **How has been addressed**: TRI Ireland, responsible for monitoring process of ethical approval has been in contact with all partners for updating the ethical approvals. The situation is as follows: CLS complete (15th of Jan2020); DemSoc complete (August 2019); HU complete (22nd of May 2020); TUD is still in process; TRI complete (28th of May 2020); CF complete)5th of June 2020); RVK complete (31st of august 2020); The updated version of the D8.2 opinions/approval of ethics committees has been submitted to the EC portal on the 30th of June 2020.
- **12.05.2020** – Revision of the Dissemination tool. Development of the website with a correct http address; expand the social media activity; release the press kits.
  - o **How has been addressed**: DemSoc the task leader of Dissemination tool has created the Tool kits that has been submitted to the EC portal on the 30th of June 2020.
- **12.05.2020** and **01.07.2020** – Review the PaCE Ethics Handbook
  - o **How has been addressed**: TRI Ireland, the task leader has been updated the PaCE Ethics Handbook in line with the reviewers´´ recommendations and the updated version has been submitted to the EC portal on the 20th of July 2020.

5. Deviations from Annex 1 and Annex 2

5.1 Tasks

There are a number of minor deviations from those described in Annex 1 and 2.

Firstly, due to the time it took to get the changes in the grant agreement regarding the shift of some budget and person-months from CLS to DEMSOC, the person to assist in WP1 has been delayed, mostly some of that in task 1.1, "Trace the historical and political growth of populism". Although the other deliverable in WP1 has been on time (D1.2), D1.1 is anticipated to be 3 months late, that is delivered at the end of April 2021.

Secondly, due to the COVID pandemic, the concept for the democracy labs had to be changed from face-face meetings to online versions of the same. This means that these had to be re-planned for this new format and hence are happening a little later than planned. One democracy lab was done before the pandemic struck and so was in the normal format. One online democracy lab has been done with an Icelandic group of citizens in January 2021 and a series of these are planned across Europe in the coming months. No Deliverables are late due to this. One of the benefits of this change is that we aim to package up our experience of running online democracy labs and provide this as a package of online advice to help others do the same.

Thirdly, tasks T3.4 ("Develop tools to help filter, identify and tag populist and liberal narratives") has taken a bit longer than thought. A prototype for internal review is now available and discussion on its final form is occurring between the partners. The presentation of this is a little tricky as we do not want to give people false impressions (e.g. making invalid comparisons between the frequency of different kinds of narrative and keywords) nor provide a tool that might be misused by those who would seek to promote misinformation online, but we do want this to be a useful tool for politicians, citizens and researchers in the EU. Deliverable D3.2 is thus also delayed 3 months until the end of April 2021.

Lastly, Project meetings have been shifted online due to the pandemic and (except possible the last one) will remain online.

5.2 Use of resources

There are a couple of minor deviations in terms of the use of resources between actual and planned (Annex 1). PLUS employed two people at a lower rate of pay rather than one person at the rate planned. This has facilitated the work in the project. However, it means that the person-months worked on the project in the time sheets will be higher than planned, even though the same amount of money has been used.

Due to the Covid pandemic, no travel for dissemination or consultation has been possible this year. Some of the money for each partner in the budget for this has been shifted to paying for online services (e.g. zoom, production of materials) in its stead.

Maybe here I would say that the structure and methodology of carrying out local democracy labs have been re-shaped in line with the traveling restriction due to the Corona pandemic. So that, at least a few of the labs

planned for the beginning of 2021 will be shifted to the online mode. The first pilot of online democracy lab has been successfully implemented in Iceland on the 30th of January 2021.

5.2.1 Unforeseen subcontracting

The amount of money needed to organise each democracy lab has turned out to be more expensive than anticipated, from €3000/event to €4000/event. Thus, DEMOSOC has required to shift some of the money they would have spent on travel on this but still keep the estimated budget necessary for running the local democracy labs within the limit budget approved by the Grant Agreement. According to the communication of MMU and DemSoc with the PO in Brussels, the required shifted budget falls under the same category **"Other direct costs"** from the **D1. Travel** to **D3. Other goods and services**. The shifting of money does not make the subject of subcontracting.