D.6.6
ELSI guidance for policy recommendations

WP6 – Ethics

Populism and Civic Engagement

1.0 About this document

Work Package 6 Lead: Trilateral Research
**Task Lead**: Trilateral Research
Contributors: Dr David Barnard-Wills, Dr Mathew Hall, Dr Anais Resseguier, & David Wright (Trilateral Research)
Due Date of Deliverable: 30 April 2022

This document reports on the ethical, legal and societal issues associated with the project's policy recommendations activities.

Dissemination Level		
PU	Public	X
PP	Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)	.

RE	Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)	
CO	Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)	

A brief summary of revisions will be recorded in the table below:

HISTORY OF CHANGES			
VERSION	**DATE**	**KEY CHANGES**	**AUTHOR**
0.1	6 September November 2021		David Barnard-Wills, Mathew Hall, Anais Resseguier
1.0	15 March 2022	Internal review	David Barnard-Wills, Mathew Hall, Anais Resseguier

The working language of this document will be English (EN), as required for reporting purposes by article 20.7 of the Grant Agreement.

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1.1 About PaCE

Across Europe there is a rise of political movements that claim to challenge liberal elites and speak for the 'ordinary person' - movements that can be loosely categorised as 'populist'. Many of these movements have undesirable tendencies. The Populism and Civic Engagement project (PaCE), with others, aims to better understand and respond to the negative tendencies of populist movements, to build upon the lessons of positive examples (such as Reykjavik), and hence play a part in constructing a firmer democratic and institutional foundation for the citizens of Europe.

PaCE will analyse, in detail, the type, growth and consequences of such movements in terms of their particular characteristics and context. From this, it will analyse the causes of these movements and their specific challenges to liberal democracy. In particular, it will focus on transitions in these movements (especially changes in leadership) as well as how they relate to other kinds of movements and the liberal reaction. PaCE will propose responses to these challenges, developing risk-analyses for each kind of response, movement and transition. To this end, it will employ the agent-based simulation of political processes and attitudes to allow for thorough risk analyses to be made. Throughout the project, it will engage with citizens and policy actors, especially groups under-represented in public affairs, face-to-face and via new forms of democratic participation appropriate to our digital age to help guide the project and to comment on its outputs.

The project will develop new tools, based on machine-learning algorithms, to both identify and track populist narratives and aid online consultation. It will result in specific interventions aimed at the public, politicians, activists and educators. It will look further into the future, developing new visions concerning how different actors could respond to populism and it will warn about longer-term trends.

1.2 Consortium

#	PARTICIPATING ORGANISATION	CODE	COUNTRY
1	Manchester Metropolitan University (**coordinator**)	MMU	UK
2	City of Reykjavik	RVK	Iceland
3	The Centre for Liberal Strategies Foundation	CLS	Bulgaria
4	The Paris-Lodron University	PLUS	Austria

5	The Technical University of Dresden	TUD	Germany
6	The Democratic Society	DEM	Belgium
7	Trilateral Research	TRI	Ireland
8	University of Helsinki	UH	Finland
9	Citizens Foundation	CF	Iceland

2.0 Introduction

This report is the analysis of the Ethical Legal and Societal Issues for the policy recommendations work in the context of the PACE research project.

This report first restates the context for its ELSI deliverables, including revisiting the explicit ethical commitments already made by the project. We then examine the general ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) at play in providing policy recommendations from research activity, as applied to the PACE project. We then specifically address the ELSI challenges that arise from producing policy recommendations in the highly politicised environment of populism research. The report concludes with a summary of the recommendations for the project.

2. 1 Why do we seek to make policy recommendations?

The PACE project analyses the causes of populist movements, explores their specific challenges to liberal democracy, develops new tools to identify and track populist narratives, and builds social simulations to study and respond to this phenomenon. It ultimately strives to construct a firmer democratic and institutional foundation for the citizens of Europe.

PACE encompasses several activities, including developing policy recommendations based upon the project's research activity. This activity occurs in the following main tasks:

- **Task 4.3 – Identifying possible policy responses.** The task aims to identify possible policy responses to address the causes of illiberal populism, according to the theoretical model developed in the PACE project. This task will be led by CLS and result in Deliverable D4.4.
- **Task 5.4 – Policy maker dissemination** – The aim of the task is to disseminate the outputs of research activities to policy makers and to engage them in dialogue around implications for the future whilst identifying strategies for strengthening democratic values and practices especially by seeking support for a future and foresight project for schools. Explore with other projects and organisations the possibility of organising a Policy Round table in Brussels. The Task will be led by UH and result in Deliverables 5.4 and 5.5
- **Task 4.4/4.5 – Creation of scenarios and Finalisation of Scenarios.** Workshops with a broad range of stakeholder representatives to develop scenarios about the possible futures of populism in a participative way. Exploring with stakeholders the implications of future, and the paths of action

that would address the emerging needs of each future. The tasks are led by TRI and RVK respectively, and result in Deliverable D4.5

For each area of the main outputs of PACE, the project will produce an analysis of the ethical, legal and societal issues relevant to that activity. We have already completed such analysis for 1) the development of ICT tools by the project and 2) the public engagement activities of the project (primarily its democracy labs). This report is the third and final report, which analyses the ethical, legal and societal issues relating to the project's policy recommendations tasks.

This report is formally due at M39 (extended from M36), but TRI prepared and circulated a completed draft within the consortium at M21 to ensure that this report was able to inform the policy recommendation activities of the project partners as those were being planned and delivered.

PACE's ELSI Work package (WP6) has three objectives relevant to this report:
* To foster trust among stakeholders with regard to the results of PaCE and how those results were achieved.
* To identify ethical requirements for policy recommendations
* To improve the project's policy recommendations and ICT tools by ensuring that outputs are of the highest ethical standard and serve the needs of people.

2. 2 Values, Principles and Ethical commitments

A starting point for exploring these issues is to identify the values and commitments that PACE has explicitly adopted.

Article 34 of the Grant Agreement (the agreement between the PACE project partners and the European Commission) highlights fundamental principles that apply to research such as that conducted in the PACE project:

> "With regards to research integrity, the Grant agreement refers to the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity. This implies compliance with the following fundamental principles:
> - **reliability** in ensuring the quality of research reflected in the design, the methodology, the analysis and the use of resources;
> - **honesty** in developing, undertaking, reviewing, reporting and communicating research in a transparent, fair and unbiased way;
> - **respect** for colleagues, research participants, society, ecosystems, cultural heritage and the environment;
> - **accountability** for the research from idea to publication, for its management and organisation, for training, supervision and mentoring, and for its wider impacts and means that beneficiaries must ensure that persons carrying out research tasks follow the good research practices and refrain from the research integrity violations described in this Code."

For the purposes of this analysis, the values of **honesty** and **accountability** are particularly relevant, but this does preclude the other values being affected.

In addition to these external commitments, the PACE consortium voluntarily adopted a set of principles, agreed at the kick-off meeting (February 2019). The full set is documented in the project's Ethics Handbook (D6.1), but some particularly relevant principles for the development and dissemination of policy recommendations are:

- Adhere to the highest standards of legal compliance, integrity, ethics, fairness and openness;
- Seek to do research of the highest possible rigour, significance and usefulness
- Sensitively address any cultural issues (gender, minorities, citizens' rights, etc);
- Actively promote the careers of early stage researchers working on the project;
- present research goals and intentions in an honest and transparent manner
- exercise due care for the subjects of research, human beings in the case of the PaCE project;
- ensure objectivity and impartiality when conducting the research and disseminating the results;[1]
- in addition to the open access obligations under Grant Agreement Article 29.2, allow as great as possible access to research data in order to enable research to be reproduced — taking into account the legitimate interest of the beneficiaries;

In addition, the consortium partners, aware of the sensitive and political nature of our research area have committed from the proposal stage to work in a non-partisan manner (taken to mean having no affiliation or connection with any organised political party or political group).

Recommendation

- Before engaging on the policy tasks, the PACE consortium should refresh their knowledge of these ethical commitments.

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[1] Consortium partners committed from the proposal stage to "work in a non-partisan nature" (Section 5 of the PaCE proposal).

3.0 Ethical, legal and societal issues in policy recommendations

In this chapter of the report we examine general ethical, legal, and societal issues in making policy recommendations from research, that could be applicable to any research domain, and therefore include PACE's more specific work on populism and civic democracy. These issues include, motivations for policy recommendations; the available and desirable roles for researchers in policy; legitimacy; potential and limits of objectivity; conflicting institutional norms and perspectives; the various roles of science in policy; the risks of validating rather than influencing policy; the appropriate audiences for recommendations; and who are the appropriate voices for the project's recommendations.

### 3. 1 Why do we seek to make policy recommendations?

Understanding our motivation and intent behind making policy recommendations is an important part of understanding the ethics around them. Motivations differ for individual researchers, but some common motivations include:

- Having a positive and practical impact on the world and making a contribution to a public good,
- Justifying the public resources used to conduct the research,
- Building or maintaining a career or reputation as an expert in a particular field,
- Identification of a policy problem or a situation that could be improved with research-based input.
- Testing our models and assumptions about how the world works against the real world by trying to put them into practice.
- Policy recommendations being requested or specifically commissioned
- Providing policy recommendations as a commercial or not-for-profit service

It is now commonplace for policy dissemination to be included in research projects, and research institutions often have a policy dissemination role as part of their organisational mandate or visions.

H2020 research projects (such as PACE) are assessed at the proposal stage upon their potential for impact and providing inputs to policy processes can be an important avenue for research impact, particularly for research in the social sciences and humanities. We assume that part of the reason for PACE's funding are the policy recommendation activities in the tasks mentioned above.

These motivations are linked to the role of science and research in policy making. This is a context against which any of PACE's policy recommendations work takes place. Theorists have provided multiple reasons for why science should inform policy making. The first of these is science and research as a basis for factually competent decisions and the understanding that good decisions require a good understanding

of how the world works.[2] A related rationale is that science provides a unique perspective on the potential impact and outcomes of policies.[3] There are requirements for this to work effectively, namely that the science is done "well" in methodological terms, results are transparent, uncertainty is properly expressed and communicated, and that values are minimised in the presentation of scientific results and perspectives.[4]

This role for science in policy making is often linked to complexity. For example, the guidance on expertise and public policy from the Parliament of Australia notes: "policy makers are becoming more reliant on the advice of experts and the institution of expertise. Expert knowledge and advice in fields as diverse as science, engineering, the law and economics is required to assist policy makers in their deliberations on complex matters of public policy and to provide them with an authoritative basis for legitimate decision making"[5]

The quote also acknowledges that a firm basis in science can be used to increase the legitimacy of policy decisions, in part by seeming to distance those policies from ideological and political motivations. As an example, see the stance taken by the UK government during the Coronavirus pandemic that their policy decisions are "following the science"[6] and a similar politics of expertise in climate science.[7]

Recommendations

- PACE partners should reflect upon their own motivations for making policy recommendations.
- PACE policy recommendations should acknowledge the motivations

PACE should document the process and evidence supporting its policy recommendations (this is already envisaged in the appropriate scientific and dissemination deliverables).

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[2] Dietz, Thomas. "Bringing Values and Deliberation to Science Communication." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (August): 14081–7. 2013.

[3] James Druckman, "Communicating Policy-Relevant Science", Political Science and Politics, August 2015, p.61; Dietz, Thomas. "Bringing Values and Deliberation to Science Communica-tion." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (August): 14081–7. 2013; Lupia, Arthur, and Colin Elman 2014. "Openness in Political Science: Data Access and Research Transparency." PS: Political Science and Politics 47: 9–42; Uhlenbrock, Kristan, Elizabeth Landau, and Erik Hankin. 2014. "Science Com-munication and the Role of Scientists in the Policy Discussion." New Trends in Earth-Science Outreach and Engagement Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research 38: 93–105.

[4] Dietz, Thomas, Christina Leshko, and Aaron M. McCright. 2013. "Politics Shapes Individual Choices about Energy Efficiency." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (June): 9181–92; Lupia, Arthur, and Colin Elman 2014. "Openness in Political Science: Data Access and Research Transparency." PS: Political Science and Politics 47: 9–42.

[5] Thomas, Matthew and Buckmaster, Luke, Expertise and Public Policy: a conceptual guide, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp /rp1314/PublicPolicy

[6] https://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/news-and-analysis/opinion/correspondence/what-does-it-really-mean-to-follow-the-science/20208008.article?firstPass=false

[7] Luis Pérez-González, 'The government is following the science': Why is the translation of evidence into policy generating so much controversy?, LSE Policy Blogs, November 12th, 2020https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2020/11/12/the-government-is-following-the-science-why-is-the-translation-of-evidence-into-policy-generating-so-much-controversy/

3. 2 What roles do we want to play?

Hank Jenkins-Smith described three broad roles for policy advisors, based upon their circumstances. Policy experts may be seen as:
- "objective technicians" who pursue the best means for the most efficient program,
- "issue advocates" who are concerned with advancing the cause of selected beneficiaries
- "client advocates," who seek to protect and advance the interests of their employers."[8]

Roger Pielke[9] has identified a five-part typology of engagement by scientists and expert. This includes four ideal types based upon the perception of democracy, and how we think about the proper role of science in a society, and a fifth that sits outside this.

View of Democracy	View of Science in society	
	Linear Model	Stakeholder model
Interest group pluralism	Pure Scientist	Issue Advocate
Elite Conflict	Science Arbiter	Honest broker of policy alternatives

In Pileke's understanding, the "**Pure Scientists**" do not really exist, because of real-world demands for impact and relevance associated with research funding. If they did exist, they would be typified by a desire not to engage with policy processes.[10] The "**Science Arbiter**" provides support to decision makers by providing answers to questions from the policy process that can be answered empirically, using scientific tools and methods. For Pileke, this is often the role of expert advisory committees. "**Issue advocates**" aim to reduce the scope of choices in the policy process, ideally down to particular favoured approaches or outcomes. This position is sometimes seen negatively from within scientific activity, but for Pileke, scientists are themselves citizens and should be allowed to play role in advocating for things they believe in (there is an open question about their use of public funding to do so, however). **The Honest broker** of policy alternatives is defined by "a desire to clarify, or sometimes to expand, the scope of options available for action". These actors empower a decision maker, but clarifying the scope of possible actions, including invention of choices that were previously unseen. Pileke is highly critical of the fifth type – the "**stealth issue advocate**" – an expert who seeks to hide their advocacy behind the appearance of being a pure scientist or science arbiter, and in doing so, pathologically politicises science and gives science in politics a negative reputation. Combining the two models – Jenkins-Smith's "client advocates" are likely a form of stealth issue advocate", both categories of issue advocate align, and the "objective

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[8] Jenkins-Smith, Hank C., "Professional Roles for Policy Analysts: A Critical Assessment," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2 (1) (Fall 1982): 88-100
[9] Pielke, R. The Honest Broker
[10] Arguably, there is an ethical question even here – if their research could potentially improve the world, is there not some obligation to do so? Such a purist could argue that this could be somebody else's job and that they are best suited to conduct "pure science".

technician" could potentially be seen in either the pure scientist, science arbiter or honest broker roles.

Context influences which are the most appropriate roles, including the politicisation of the field, and the particular problems it is experiencing. Pileke suggests that it is challenging for individual scientists and researchers to play the role of science arbitrator or honest broker, especially in politicised environments, and as such, such activities are best done in groups, committees and institutions, ideally by "legitimate, authoritative bodies which are well-connected to policy makers". He also supports the longer-term development of mechanisms of science arbitration and honest brokering.

At the core of Pileke's argument is that scientific integrity matters because of the need for expertise in decision making, and the is a major risk if science becoming politicised (and thereby losing its legitimacy in public debates). Whilst there are roles in a functioning system for all four ideal types, the ethical responsibility is to be open about clear about roles and context.

Related to the role experts play is the more concrete *method* by which they should play them. Fisher et al conducted a systematic review of scientific publications (mainly in environmental policy, public health, agriculture and food safety) that engaged with the policy process. They found that typically the rationale and choice of the method through which the research engaged were rarely discussed or justified, and rarely evaluated.[11]

Finally, Benveniste offers a warning about the relatively unusual relationship between experts and policy makers:

"In contrast to other professional relationships, the "Prince" who hires policy experts is nearly always highly sophisticated and powerful. He may be a judge in a court of law, a head of state, an elected body, a government agency, or a corporation. Accordingly, whereas the client-professional relationship in medicine or law, for example, is usually one in which the client is highly dependent on the professional, the contrary is true with policy experts. The client often possesses political sagacity beyond that of the expert, as well as knowledge in areas that impinge on the specialist's domain. For instance, the "Prince" may not know the construction details of high-pressure boilers, but he is likely to understand the political milieu in which energy policy is set."[12]

Recommendations:

- The consortium's commitment to non-partisanship may suggest we should be careful about how we are policy advocates (at least within the context of the project's work), and certainly PACE should avoid being stealth policy advocates.

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[11] Fischer, A., Wentholt, M., Rowe, G., et al., "Expert involvement in policy development: A systematic review of current practice", Science and Public Policy, 41(3), pp.332-343, 2013.
[12] Benveniste - code of ethics for policy experts, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 3, No. 3, 561 -572 (1984) https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/pam.4050030406, p.563

- PACE Consortium should identify together what role (or roles) the consortium as a whole, and individual researchers within it wish to play.
  - If we wish to be science arbitrators – what are the open empirical questions that policy makers (and publics) have regarding populism, where might we have answers, or our methods and tools might be able to provide more information?
  - If we wish to be honest brokers - To what extent do our research findings open up the scope of available policy options?
- PACE Consortium should identify possibilities to feed research findings through appropriate authoritative bodies – are there potential "honest brokers" or "arbitrators" in this field we can collaborate with and provide research to?
- PACE can document its choices of policy dissemination methods in appropriate WP7 deliverables.

3. 3 About what can we legitimately make recommendations?

Even well-meaning experts can step outside of their domains of expertise, unintentionally or intentionally exploiting the "halo" of expertise to express opinions on related and not-so-related domains and issues, and have these listened to. Non-experts (and the policy advocates above) can exaggerate their expertise to similar effect.

Fundamentally, the legitimacy of the PACE consortium to make policy recommendations rests upon the research work we are doing in the project (and its antecedent work by others that we build upon), and to a lesser extent, the previous work that consortium partners have done in other contexts and the experience they have developed doing this.

Non-experts (including policy makers) on the receiving end of policy recommendations are faced by the challenge of evaluating the expertise of the experts making them. This is a particular challenge in technically complex domains, and may be limited to social expertise – the everyday expertise of understanding who and when to trust, and what to believe. Policy makers are advised to ask themselves:
- Can I make sense of the arguments?
- Which experts seem the more credible?
- Who has numbers on their side?
- Are there any relevant interests or biases? And
- What are the experts' track records.[13]

It would be inappropriate to game or "reverse engineer" our advice to appear more credible than we are based upon our research, but there are steps that can be taken to provide this information and display credible signals.

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[13] Thomas, Matthew and Buckmaster, Luke, Expertise and Public Policy: a conceptual guide, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/PublicPolicy

Recommendations

- Our policy recommendations should follow clearly from the research we have done, and we should be able to demonstrate how this is the case (we should be able to "show our working"). This should form part of the work in the policy recommendations deliverables and be summarised in any direct engagement with policy makers.
- Our arguments supporting our policy recommendations should be clear and understandable, and we should be able to provide evidence.
- Where there are open questions that we do not have evidence for based upon our research, we should be very cautious about making recommendations on these topics, or at the very least, clearly signal that we are stepping away from evidence towards more speculative assessments.
    - This is pertinent for the work on future scenarios, but also for our technology outputs where we need to understand the limitations and potential blind spots of the analysis tools that we build.
- PACE policy recommendations can be accompanied by a fair and accurate presentation of the consortium's track record in this area.

3. 4 Can we be objective, and should we be?

Scientific knowledge and expertise are often linked with objectivity – some form of allowing only facts to motivate our policy recommendations. For many reasons (cognitive limitations, epistemic frameworks, economic or institutional incentives) this becomes an unsustainable position. For example, sociologists tend to argue that numerous social forces and noncognitive factors influence what scientists learn, how they package it, and how readily it is accepted. A very simple example would be that we are often drawn to do research in fields that interest or concern us.

Often the assumption is that this leaves us without the possibility of objectivity, with only bias and irrationality remaining. However, Helen Longino challenges this assumption, arguing that social interaction is important for securing firm, rationally based knowledge.[14] She argues that "objectivity" essentially emerges from keeping scientific discourses open to scrutiny and allowing a wider community to observe, comment up, and correct the process. It is not about individual researchers being objective, but the depth and scope of interrogation that occurs in a given scientific community.[15]

Munnichs makes a similar argument in relation to competing expert claims in the absence of clear standards to judge those claims. The value-laden or partisan nature of expert claims requires a process of expert *dispute* in which experts and counter-

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[14] https://aeon.co/essays/trumped-up-charges-of-feminist-bias-are-bad-for-science
[15] Longion, Helen, E., The Fate of Knowledge, Prineton University Press, 2002.

experts can participate.[16] Munnichs suggests that experts commitments – and those experts demonstrating that they hold certain commitments might even contribute to their credibility as it brings perspectives into the public debate. Dietz however, highlights the importance of avoiding conflating scientific information with values that may vary among the population.[17]

Recommendations

- PACE should be open and transparent about how its policy recommendations flow from its research activity, including about the gaps and limitations in our knowledge and methods.
- PACE should identify how it can test or "sense-check" its policy recommendations by others working in the field (perhaps through a workshop or putting the recommendations report out for peer-review).
- PACE should pursue the conventional methods for interrogating and evaluating research output (e.g. seeking peer-reviewed publication, etc).
- PACE should consider who would dispute our recommendations and what their strongest arguments and reasons would be. We should take such critiques seriously and engage with these critics.

3. 5 Conflicting institutional norms and organisational priorities

The PACE consortium is made up of different types of organisations with different constitutions, different and of course situated in different national and regional political contexts. This may present them with different preferred modes of political engagement or indeed different levels of experience in policy engagement. Some organisations may have a stronger or weaker institutional position which may affect the recommendations individual researchers or teams can make. Some partners may be more at risk when making policy recommendations than others.

Naomi Oreskes argues that diverse perspectives are actually beneficial to reaching trusted and valid outputs. She argues that all things being equal a diverse community that embraces criticism is more likely to detect and correct error than a homogeneous and self-satisfied one.[18]

Recommendations

- PACE partners should identify together any potential conflicts of interest (arising from professional or academic self-interest or individual commitments) before engaging in policy recommendations.

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[16] Munnichs, G. Whom to Trust? Public Concerns, Late Modern Risks, and Expert Trustworthiness. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 17, 113–130 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JAGE.0000017391.41994.d2
[17] Dietz 2013, 14086
[18] Oreskes, Naomi, Why Trust Science?, Princeton University Press, 2019.

- PACE partners should be open to the different perspectives and requirements of their other partners, and approach differences and disagreements with respect.
- When speaking as a representative of PACE (rather than from their own individual work, or from their institutional position) team members should be able to present a perspective that the consortium can support, or acknowledge that a view may not be held by the whole consortium.

3. 6 The trap of validating, not informing, policy

A more pessimistic review is that policy recommendations and information provided by experts do not serve to inform policy, but rather the involvement of the experts in the processes forms part of a process of political and social validation of pre-determined policies. Writing from the perspective of a constrained policy-maker (in United States context) staging demonstrative consultations with experts, Jeremy Shapiro writes:

"He bothers because the thinkers are important to him—but, ironically, not because of their thoughts. The thinkers are the validators. They will write op-eds, give pithy quotes to important newspapers, and appear on network news programs. The government official desperately wants the thinkers to give him the benefit of the doubt when his inevitably flawed policy comes up for critical examination, as they are an important source of its ultimate evaluation by the Congress and the public. The briefings therefore tend to take place before important diplomatic meetings or foreign trips that will predictably occasion a round of media coverage on the policy in question."[19]

Shaprio warns that the type of meetings with policy makers that seem to offer an opportunity to persuade are actually opportunities to be persuaded. Similarly, Guy Benveniste, raises the concern that expert's views can be influenced by pressure from their "principals", as part of his requirements for a potential code of ethics for policy experts.[20]

Recommendations:

- PACE partners should be aware of the possibility of project work, identity or their own reputation as researchers and experts to be used by policy makers to validate pre-determined policies and approaches.
- Where researchers feel under undue pressure, they should be able to raise this with the project's management team for discussion.

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[19] Jeremy Shapiro, "Who influences whom? reflections on U.S. Government outreach to think tanks", Wednesday June 3, 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/06/04/who-influences-whom-reflections-on-u-s-government-outreach-to-think-tanks/
[20] Benveniste - code of ethics for policy experts, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 3, No. 3, 561 -572 (1984)

3. 7 Who are we making recommendations to?

PACE also needs to consider to whom it is making policy recommendations. As stated earlier it has already made a commitment to non-partisanship. This would seem to indicate that PACE should not be provide direct advice to political parties, or that is should make any advice to political parties generally and publicly available. However, as discussed below, research and policy around populism is inherently political, and real-world political parties have an interest in, for example, the increase or decrease in populist sentiments amongst voters, or in various proposals for reforms to political systems.

Consideration of audience is also important for the generality or specificity of our recommendations. A more targeted set of recommendations can be more specific and detailed, and more aligned to as particular context, but risks being of less use or value to other actors.

Who we make our policy recommendations to is particularly pertinent for activities such as the Task 4.4 – Creation of Scenarios and 4.5 Finalisation of Scenarios. A typical method of using scenarios in a policy making process is *scenario planning*.[21] In this method, scenarios are created for a particular actor or institution who are looking to envisage possible futures and plan strategies that respond to the challenges of a range of potential futures. For this method to be effective requires picking a policy making institution to act as the focal point for the scenarios. If PACE elects not to have such a focal point, then the scenario methodology can build potential scenarios, but stops short of full scenario planning. The scenario methodology of Backcasting[22] involves identifying a desired end-state and working backwards from that to identify policies or programmes that could connect that desired future to the present. To this extent it has a definite normative dimension. Dark scenarios[23], written to rise alarm bells about unwanted futures, could potentially provide a road-map for actors wanting to bring about those negative scenarios.

Several of the PACE partners are themselves potential audiences for policy recommendations arising from the project.

Recommendations:

- Task 5.4 should provide a rationale for the audience for policy maker dissemination activities that takes these concerns into account.
- Policy maker dissemination from PACE should be transparent.
- Task 4.4's selection of methods for scenario planning should explicitly consider the extent to which is it appropriate to imagine a focal point or 'client'

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[21] Wright, George & Cairns, George, Scenario Thinking: Practical approaches to the future, Palgrave, 2011.
[22] http://www.foresight-platform.eu/community/forlearn/how-to-do-foresight/methods/roadmap/backcasting/
[23] Ahonen P. et al. Dark scenarios. In: Wright D., Friedewald M., Punie Y., Gutwirth S., Vildjiounaite E. (eds) Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht, 2008, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6662-7_3

for the scenario research. The selection of methods should consider which methods are explicitly normative (imagine a desired political end-state) and which are more open, and potentially usable by a greater range of actors.

- PACE partners who might themselves be an audience for policy recommendations arising from the project's research work should identify the issues which they are interested in exploring.

3. 8 Who makes our recommendations?

Deirdre McCloskey argued that whenever we judge an argument, we are also inevitably judging or assessing the speaker, and that (whilst we may wish it otherwise) this is an essential and unchangeable aspect of speech.[24] In formal reports, authors can speak with one, mutually agreed voice, but in other contexts, those providing policy advice might be speaking on their own standing. The consortium may also be tasked with deciding who should represent it – e.g., on a conference agenda, or in a social media video, for example. Who the consortium chooses to speak for it has an ethical dimension. Typical practice would be to designate the most senior members of the consortium to provide policy recommendations, trading upon their seniority or experience as markers of their authority and legitimacy to provide those recommendations. As is well evidenced, seniority is often unevenly distributed along lines of age, gender and ethnicity.

But this is far from the only possible way to approach these choices. Such choices can be used to actively support early career researchers gaining experience (one of the ethical principles adopted by the project) and to support a diverse range of voices.

Can the project use its policy recommendations activity to actively promote the careers of early stage researchers working on the project (one of our stated principles), rather than leaving these activities entirely to more established researchers? There is an opportunity here to support early stage researchers in gaining experience in research communication, which will contribute to their career development. Unfortunately, seniority is often taken as a proxy for competence or knowledge of a research area, and policy makers *may* be less willing to listen to less established voices.

Recommendations

- When planning policy maker dissemination, partners should consider the ability to have early stage researchers to present our research, supported as appropriate by more established researchers.

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[24] Deirdre N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics (Second Edition), University of Wisconsin Press, 1998.

- PACE should identify how senior researchers, with an existing public profile, and can support more junior voices in becoming involved in the policy recommendations process.

4.0 Policy recommendations in the domain of populism and civic engagement

In addition to the general ethical issues around the production of policy recommendations discussed in the previous chapter, there are specific dynamics and issues that arise because of the nature of the area in which PACE might make such recommendations. These are the crowded nature of a domain full of policy recommendations with various levels of rigour; that as a political subject, the domain is deeply and inherently politicised; that part of the characterisation of populism involves a scepticisms towards both experts and "elite" institutions, including the European Union, and the broader context of the relationship between liberalism, democracy and technocracy. This chapter address each of these in turn.

4.1 A crowded domain

The study of populism in politics is a growing domain with an increasing number of researchers, publications, and policy reports. The academic attention to the topic is joined by a wider range of political writing, including journalism, often talking about, and conflating together, a diverse range of political phenomena. Such publications often feature recommendations for how political actors and institutions should respond to populism, populists, or populist tendencies, often based around what their authors see as the key causal factors behind the apparent rise in such politics. The targets for such recommendations are also very broad.

Such recommendations for "countering" populism include (a very limited and non-representative sample):

- Resolving the underlying problems
    - Revising macroeconomic, taxation, industrial and commercial policies
    - Acknowledging the globalisation, economic progress and tax reductions impact upon particular parts of the population[25]
- Explain to populist supporters why the visions of populist parties are amoral or unrealistic.[26]
- Other political parties not allowing populist arguments to dominate politics by setting a different political agenda.[27] They should adopt populist styles of conducting politics in support of more "mainstream" policies.[28]

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[25] Argandona, Antonio, "Why populism is rising and how to combat it", Forbes, 24 January 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/iese/2017/01/24/why-populism-is-rising-and-how-to-combat-it/
[26] Mudde, Cas, "How can liberals defeat populism? Here are four ideas", The Guardian, 13 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/13/liberals-populism-world-forum-democracy-5-ideas
[27] Mudde, Cas, "How can liberals defeat populism? Here are four ideas", The Guardian, 13 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/13/liberals-populism-world-forum-democracy-5-ideas
[28] Woods, Ngaire, "How to Steal the Populists' Clothes", Project Syndicate, 11 April 2018, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/lessons-from-populist-politics-by-ngaire-woods-2018-04?barrier=accesspaylog

- Journalists and commentators should stop hyping populists.[29]
- Political parties should seek to propose inclusive visions and programs that deliver benefits for all citizens not only parts of the voters.[30]
- Participatory and deliberative platforms and initiatives (citizens' assemblies, juries, forums) should be embedded into the decision-making processes to balance the oligarchic tendencies of electoral democracies.
- Social media should be regulated and held accountable for damaging a pluralistic, fact-based and hate-free political debate, either in the same way as traditional media, or through innovative methods.
- Curb immigration and send out stronger signals that Europe is not going to be able to continue to provide refuge and support (Hilary's Clinton's 2018 suggestion).[31]
- Restructuring western society to de-emphasise meritocracy, recognise the dignity of work, encourage common spaces and encourage those who have done well in society to see this as contingent.[32]
- The EU should articulate its messages in a more punctual and inspirational way whilst acknowledging problems as problems.[33]

By making its own policy recommendations PACE is stepping into a crowded and contested field.

Recommendations:

- We need to be well aware of the existing policy recommendations in this domain, and have a considered and evidence-based assessment of their suitability. For example, based on our evidence around the causes of populism, would we believe such strategies likely to be successful (either on their own terms or against some other appropriate criteria for success that accords with our ethical principles)?

4.2 An inherently politicised domain

The PACE project is studying political parties and movements, with aims and objectives that include the taking and exercise of political power, including through electoral contests and by other means. Whilst we often find ourselves arguing that there is always a politics in even very technical topics, this is a clear case of a very explicitly politicised topic. Pielke warns about the responsibility of the expert to be informed about the nature of engagement before engaging. He argues "It does no

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[29] Mondon, Aurelien & Winter, Aaron, *Reactionary Demoracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right Become Mainstream*, Verso, 2020.
[30] https://rm.coe.int/world-forum-for-democracy-2017-final-report/16807840c7
[31] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/22/hillary-clinton-europe-must-curb-immigration-stop-populists-trump-brexit
[32] Sandel, Michael, *The Tyranny of Merit: What's Become of the Common Good*, Allen Lane, 2020.
[33] Missiroli, Antonio, "The rise of anti-EU populism: why and what to do about it, European Policy Centre, Policy Brief, 12 September 2011,
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/135272/pub_1331_the_rise_of_anti-eu_populism.pdf

good to explain how you wish the world worked or how it should work as an excuse for not understanding real-world political context"[34]

As discussed above in relation to the audiences for recommendations, a suggestion such as to use a hypothetical example "increasing democratic political participation will reduce support for populist parties" will be seen by some political actors as an opportunity, but by others as an existential threat. Second, much of the popular debate around populism constructs a divide between "mainstream" politician and political parties and populist outsides/challengers. In practice, this boundary can be quite porous – for example, mainstream political parties can adopt populist rhetoric and strategies[35] and that populist ideas area often articulated alongside non-populist elements[36]. Given that "populist" can be used as a term of critique in these popular accounts, the very definitions of the subject matter are highly politicised.

As discussed above, Pielke's role of the honest broker becomes a more difficult role to play in politicised environments. Arthur Lupia provides several recommendations for communicating science in politicised environments. He argues that audiences have less capacity to pay attention to scientific presentations that many communicators anticipate, but that also people in politicised environments often make different choices about who to believe than people do in other settings.[37] One of Lupia's insights is the importance of source credibility – the conditions under which audiences in politicised environments will believe what a scientist has to say.

This is supported by Druckman, who collates several reasons for scepticisms towards the outputs of research, of which " the central point is that relaying even ostensibly credible scientific information faces a serious hurdle if individuals reject any evidence that seems to contradict their prior opinions"[38] This difficulty is exacerbated by *intentional politicisation* – introducing doubt or challenging scientific findings with a political purpose in mind.

Druckman's recommendation is that scientists and analysts need to recognise that there will be differing values held by people, and that this will likely lead to different opinions, even in the light of the same factual information. In his account, there is no possibility here of resolving value-based disagreements with fact-based processes. Instead, he encourages researchers to "focus on the science and minimise the value commentary."[39] However, the scientific process does have value choices in it (for example what to research and how to go about it), and that we should recognise the

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[34] http://rogerpielkejr.blogspot.com/2015/01/five-modes-of-science-engagement.html
[35] Arditi, Benjamin, "Populism as an Internal Periphery of Democratic Politics", in Francisco Panizza (Ed), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, Verso, 2005, p.78
[36] De Cleen, Benjamin, Glynos, Jason, & Mondon, Aurelien, "Critical Research on Populism: Nine Rules of Engagement", *Organization*, Vol 25, No.5, 2018.
[37] Arthur Lupia, Communicating science in politicized environments, PNAS august 20, 2013, Vol 110, no.. 3, 14048-14054
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/110/Supplement_3/14048.full.pdf
[38] Druckman, James, "Communicating Policy-Relevant Science, Political Science and Politics, August 2015, p.60
[39] Druckman, James, "Communicating Policy-Relevant Science, Political Science and Politics, August 2015, p.63

value choices made through scientific processes, and emphasise the aspects of the process that make these choices relatively credible.

The strong politicisation of the domain is linked to the challenge of defining what exactly is the "problem" of populism, that is understood as requiring a policy response. Problematisation (the construction and representation of what is taken to be a political problem) plays an important part in structuring political space, and for coordinating the governance activities of multiple actors and institutions.[40] The way such problems are constructed often carry with them the seeds or constraints of possible solutions or responses.

To meet our commitment to non-partisanship, the "problem of populism" for PACE, cannot simply be that populist political parties are contesting or winning elections, taking votes from other non-populist parties, or are operating in the public sphere. In the PACE project proposal, we spoke about responding to the negative impacts of populist politics. It appears to be more of a meta-level impact rather than in the midst of everyday political contestation – for example, reduce public trust, reduced social cohesion, a polarising or worsening of the quality of public debate, support for violence or coercion in political life, or the weakening of institutions with desirable social roles. Policy recommendations should have a very clear account of what these negative impacts are. Even higher-level political problems (e.g. a lack of trust) maintain a political dimension. For example, a reduced level of trust in the institutions of civic society, could be argued to be an appropriate social response to a perceived failure of those institutions. It may be most appropriate to state and evidence why we believe particular issues are challenges for society that deserve or require a response. Indeed, identifying issues where social problems emerge from populist politics, that could be recognised as problems by actors on both sides of the political polarisation, may be a useful policy advisory role.

Recommendations

- PACE should consider and evaluate existing problematisations of populism and consider the extent to which we are able to accept these, even if in a qualified form.
- PACE should agree and document a clear perspective on what the project considers the negative impacts of populist politics to be.
    - The project should remain aware that even this is a political decision, even if we aim for one that is acceptable to the largest number of actors, and accords with our agreed ethical principles, it should be open to discussion.
    - Can we identify any "negative impacts of populism" where there is likely to be large-scale agreement that this is a negative impact?
- Can PACE identify policy recommendations arising from its work that are likely to received broad support, even within a heavily politicised context?

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[40] Dean, Mitchell, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, (2nd Edition), London. Sage, 2010, p.37, and Miller, Peter & Rose, Nikolas, *Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life*,

    o   Can the democracy labs provide any insight on this?

4.3 Direct populist scepticism towards "experts" and scientists

Populist political actors have expressed criticism of scientists and academic institutions, and a general criticism of experts and expertise, sometimes expressed in a way which includes scientists and scholarly institutions within the establishment or the elite. Multiple studies in political science have found associations between populist sentiment and mistrust towards intellectuals and experts, [41] [42] and between supporting populist parties and having lower trust in universities that supporters of other political parties. [43] [44] Luc Rouban argues that weakened trust in institutions, including academic and experts, actually comes from something more fundamental to the nature of contemporary politics. Such distrust varies along socio-economic lines, with lower-income class groups basing trust around close-at-hand relationships, with a greater preference for more direct democracy and people who can be seen and interacted with, whilst more upper and middle classes put greater emphasis upon professional competence and complex institutions with distanced politics.[45]

Mede and Schafer conceptualise a specifically science-related form of populism as a set of ideas which suggests that there is a morally charged antagonism between an (allegedly) virtuous ordinary people and an (allegedly) unvirtuous academic elite.[46]

This is related to the general possibility for a loss of legitimacy in public perception of expertise. For Benveniste, the legitimacy of experts is diminished when:
- Experts are perceived to play a political role,
- Expertise is being drawn upon in connection to highly visible risk decisions,
- Experts disagree amongst themselves,
- A technically untrained public cannot distinguish between arguments based on scientific uncertainty and those that mask narrow interests,

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[41] Merkley E., "Anti-intellectualism, populism, and motivated resistance to expert consensus", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol 84, No.1, pp.24-48, 2020.

[42] Oliver J.E. and Rahn W.M., "Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 election", The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 667(1): 189–206, 2016.

[43] Saarinen A, Koivula A and Keipi T, "Political trust, political party preference and trust in knowledge-based institutions", International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 40(1–2): 154–168, 2020.

[44] Filc, D., and Lebel, U. "The post-Oslo Israeli populist radical right in comparative perspective"., Mediterranean Politics, 10(1): 85–9, 2005

[45] The Dark Matter of Democracy, Origins of the Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests), Cogito Research Magazine, 13 February 2010, https://www.sciencespo.fr/research/cogito/home/the-dark-matter-of-democracy/?lang=en

[46] Niels G. Mede and Mike S. Schafer, "Science Related Populism: Conceptualizing populist demands towards science", Public understanding of science, 2020, vol 29(5), 473-491

- Decisions are made rapidly, with insufficient time to explore expert's choices or engage in normal consultative process and public decision making.[47]

The point about disagreement unfortunately conflicts with the advice given above to expose our ideas and recommendations to external criticisms and review, as part of increasingly the reliability of those recommendations. This latter exercise is necessary, and to that extent is likely that we can only attempt to communicate the nature any resulting disagreement and identify areas where there is more agreement.

Recommendation

- PACE should anticipate significant distrust of its motives and outputs from populist supporters, especially if we are seen as playing an active political role.

4.4 Populism and the push back against technocracy

Anders Esmark suggests that the rise of populist parties and movements, has contributed to renewed discussion of the relationship between liberal and/or democratic systems of politics and *technocracy*.[48] In such accounts, the dominance of technocracy as a mode of politics serves as an explanation for the rise of populism as a counter-reaction.[49] Smilova & Smilov discuss this in terms of the role of expert bodies in a crisis of political representation, identifying a potential link between voting for populist parties and frustration with the ability of elections to change politics.[50]

Technocracy is a system of government (or a tendency within other systems of government) characterised by the exercise of power by experts, by virtue of their specialised knowledge and expertise, and their position in dominant political and economic institutions. Esmark positions technocracy alongside democracy and bureaucracy as part of the history of modern politics, and argues that what characterises modern technocracy are principles of connective government, risk management and performance management.[51] Technocracy is depoliticising in that it requires the expulsion of politics from government in favour of a supposedly rational and scientific management of society. The result is that technocracy exists in opposition to including the everyday practical experiences of ordinary citizens as well as the positions and perspectives of interest groups. Bernard Crick's "defence of

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[47] Benveniste, Guy. "On a code of ethics for policy experts", Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol.3, No.4, pp561-572, 1984.
[48] Esmark, Anders, "The technocratic take-over of democracy: Connectivity, reflexivity ad accountability", ICPP 2017 Singapore. https://www.ippapublicpolicy.org//file/paper/594bba371f736.pdf
[49]
[50] Smilova, Ruzha & Smilov, Daniel, *Theoretical Model of Causes of Populism*, PACE project D4.2, November 2020, p.33
[51] Esmark, Anders, "The technocratic take-over of democracy: Connectivity, reflexivity ad accountability", ICPP 2017 Singapore. https://www.ippapublicpolicy.org//file/paper/594bba371f736.pdf

politics against technology" offers a similar warning of the threat to politics from "scientism".[52] The difference is that here "technocracy" is positioned as itself a fiction, and that the rational expulsion of interests and difference from politics is inherently impossible and unstable, but is nevertheless still a problematic drive within contemporary politics. Colin Hay draws attention to the "public politics of depoliticization": In this mode of governance, "politics" (parliamentary politics, interest groups, democratic contestation) acts as a barrier to adopting the appropriate and technically proficient solutions to problems.[53] For Hay, this combines with the tendency for political actors to overestimate the extent to which economic globalisation has limited their autonomy, capacity and ability to respond to citizen's demands, to explain disenchantment with formal politics.

Claus Offe further suggests that the very concept of "policy" itself is likely to be regarded sceptically or even with hostility by populist discourses, as having elitist and technocratic associations, and describing activities that have no roots in, or legitimation through mass politics.[54] Bickerton and Accetti find similar ideas in the work of both Ernesto Laclau and Pierre Rosanvallon.[55] In many ways "policy" can stand in for the depoliticization of politics to matters of technical choice.

The PACE consortium would be unlikely to consider themselves *technocrats*, however, as (attempted) providers of policy recommendations, we are interacting with a world that contains technocratic dynamics, and that these technocratic tendencies are an object of critique and potential causal factor for our subject of study.

Recommendations:

- This suggests that the consortium should be aware of the extent to which any policy recommendations it makes fall into this dynamic.
    - Are we excluding politics and interests or are we open to them?
    - Are we encouraging a world in which political decisions are open to challenge and contestation, rather than closing down such engagement?
    - Can we make recommendations to audiences and in environments that are not primarily about "policy" in the narrow, technocratic, managerial sense.

4.5 Expertise and liberalism

Zoltan Majdik & William Keith suggest that expertise is a type of authority and as such it stands in inherent tension with liberal democratic values related to the ability of all citizens to participate in collective decision making. They suggest that a

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[52] Crick, Bernard, *In Defence of Politics*, Continuum, London & New York, 2005.
[53] Hay. Colin, *Why we Hate Politics*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007.
[54] Claus Offe, 2013, p.610. cited in Bickerton and Accetti
[55] Bickerton, Christopher & Accetti, Carlo Invernzzi, "Populism and Technocracy: opposites or complements, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2015.

functioning democratic polity that holds to these values actually depends on its ability to keep a check on various forms of authority, including that which arise from expertise.[56] This suggests that the relationship between experts and publics can vary over time, even within liberal democracies. In this manner, Stephen Turner writes about what he calls the *new politics of expertise*, in which:

"expertise itself is at stake and in which the establishment of expertise, the judging of expertise, the assertion of bias, and the problems and conflicts of interest, are central. The new politics is intelligible as politics, but not as interest politics of the traditional kind."[57]

Like Majdik & Keith, Turner argues that specialised technical discourses, including science, present a fundamental political problem for liberal democracies. This is because, for Turner, the basis of a liberal democracy is a political discussion that is largely intelligible to the general population, and therefore subject to influence from that population through representative institutions. The existence and social importance of technical expertise, which is not so generally intelligible creates a challenge for liberal democracies. The risk, is that:

"experts are needed by liberal democracy, but only experts understand what they are talking about and what is a matter of expert knowledge; to allow them to decide what belongs in the expert domain means that experts might place topics that should be subject to public discussion in the domain of 'expert knowledge.' "[58]

The risk (related to technocracy above) is that a politics of expertise emerges in which political decisions are presented as necessary interventions above political contestation and debate.[59]

Thomas and Buckmaster suggest there are broadly three approaches to easing the problem of expertise and the power imbalance between experts and non-experts. The first is public education – where scientific experts engage in public communication and education to try and assist the public in understanding complex issues. The second is building democratic controls over expertise – for example public hearings, citizen's juries etc, where the public are able to question experts and reporting on their conclusions as part of deliberative democracy. The third method is the institutionalisation of expert contestation – essentially building processes through which experts can check and contest each other's policy claims.[60]

Recommendations

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[56] Zoltan Majdik & William Keith
[57] Stephen Turner, Liberal Democracy 3.0 – Civil Society in an Age of Experts, Sage, 2003, pp.4-5
[58] Ibid, p.6
[59] Fischer, Frank. Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise. Newbury Park/London/New Delhi: Sage., 1990, p.26
[60] Thomas, Matthew and Buckmaster, Luke, Expertise and Public Policy: a conceptual guide, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/PublicPolicy

- The PACE consortium should consider if it is possible to put our policy recommendations up for public scrutiny in a way that allows the public to ask questions and get answers. This goes beyond the conventional practice of simply publishing our report (a basic requirement).
  - Depending upon timing, is it possible to put any policy recommendations to one or more of the project's democracy labs, or create the opportunity for students to discuss them through the educational outreach and dissemination work?
- Can we find a way to get other experts in the field of populism or our methodological domains to review our policy recommendations? Whilst our research and analytical work is likely to encounter scientific review when put forward for publication, this is much less likely for our policy recommendations unless we take this forward intentionally. Other research projects funded under the same call might be suitable candidates for this.

4.6 Scepticism towards the sources of research funding

A general critique of policy experts is that they too often serve the narrow interests of their employers and their own profession, as a result, their policy proposals are suspect, and their legitimacy undermined.[61] The validity of this critique is an empirical question, and likely varies across different polities and policy areas.

In the context of research into populism, this raises a challenge in that within the EU criticism of the European Union and/or its institutions has become a hallmark of populist, nativists and anti-democratic movements.[62] Criticism of the EU as technocratic are not limited to populist political actors. Mark Leonard describes the EU as "the ultimate technocratic project" but its very success as a maturing bureaucratic phenomenon has produced a populist backlash at the national level in Member States.[63]

The PACE research project is funded by the European Commission as part of its H2020 research programme. The goals and ambitions of this research programme are set by the European Commission, and individual research consortia respond to these calls for research by putting forward a proposal for a project. Typically, a call for proposals will identify some impact that the project should have, but will leave the means to the realisation of this impact to the potential consortia. The PACE consortium engaged in lengthy discussion between the partners about the appropriate objectives for the project. Projects are reviewed on the basis of technical and scientific excellence, their potential for impact, and the quality of the proposed

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[61] Benveniste - code of ethics for policy experts, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 3, No. 3, 561 -572 (1984)
[62] See for example, Reungoat, Emmanuelle, "Anti-EU parties and the People: An analysis of Populism in French Euromanifestos, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol.11, No.3, 2010.
[63] Mark Leonard, 2011.

work plan and management approaches. These reviews are conducted by external, independent experts, working under a code of conduct.[64]

Recommendations

- PACE is already under an obligation to acknowledge the EU source of its research funding in its publication and dissemination activities, with a disclaimer that these materials do not represent the views of either the European Union or the European Commission.

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[64] https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/support/h2020_call-individual_experts_oj_c342_03.pdf

5.0 Conclusion and recommendations

This report has examined the ethical, legal and societal issues at play in providing policy recommendations from research activity, in general, and particularly in the field of research into populist politics, and has produced recommendations to inform the specific policy recommendation activities of the PACE project. Below is the collated set of recommendations for PACE made in this report.

- Before engaging on the policy tasks, the PACE consortium should refresh their knowledge of these ethical commitments.
- PACE partners should reflect upon their own motivations for making policy recommendations.
- PACE policy recommendations should acknowledge the motivations
- PACE should document the process and evidence supporting its policy recommendations (this is already envisaged in the appropriate scientific and dissemination deliverables).
- The consortium's commitment to non-partisanship may suggest we should be careful about how we are policy advocates (at least within the context of the project's work), and certainly PACE should avoid being stealth policy advocates.
- PACE Consortium should identify together what role (or roles) the consortium as a whole, and individual researchers within it wish to play.
    - If we wish to be science arbitrators – what are the open empirical questions that policy makers (and publics) have regarding populism, where might we have answers, or our methods and tools might be able to provide more information?
    - If we wish to be honest brokers - To what extent do our research findings open up the scope of available policy options?
- PACE Consortium should identify possibilities to feed research findings through appropriate authoritative bodies – are there potential "honest brokers" or "arbitrators" in this field we can collaborate with and provide research to?
- PACE can document its choices of policy dissemination methods in appropriate WP7 deliverables.
- Our policy recommendations should follow clearly from the research we have done, and we should be able to demonstrate how this is the case (we should be able to "show our working"). This should form part of the work in the policy recommendations deliverables and be summarised in any direct engagement with policy makers.
- Our arguments supporting our policy recommendations should be clear and understandable, and we should be able to provide evidence.
- Where there are open questions that we do not have evidence for based upon our research, we should be very cautious about making recommendations on

these topics, or at the very least, clearly signal that we are stepping away from evidence towards more speculative assessments.

  o This is pertinent for the work on future scenarios, but also for our technology outputs where we need to understand the limitations and potential blind spots of the analysis tools that we build.

- PACE policy recommendations can be accompanied by a fair and accurate presentation of the consortium's track record in this area.
- PACE should be open and transparent about how its policy recommendations flow from its research activity, including about the gaps and limitations in our knowledge and methods.
- PACE should identify how it can test or "sense-check" its policy recommendations by others working in the field (perhaps through a workshop or putting the recommendations report out for peer-review).
- PACE should pursue the conventional methods for interrogating and evaluating research output (e.g. seeking peer-reviewed publication, etc).
- PACE should consider who would dispute our recommendations and what their strongest arguments and reasons would be. We should take such critiques seriously and engage with these critics.
- PACE partners should identify together any potential conflicts of interest (arising from professional or academic self-interest or individual commitments) before engaging in policy recommendations.
- PACE partners should be open to the different perspectives and requirements of their other partners, and approach differences and disagreements with respect.
- When speaking as a representative of PACE (rather than from their own individual work, or from their institutional position) team members should be able to present a perspective that the consortium can support, or acknowledge that a view may not be held by the whole consortium.
- PACE partners should be aware of the possibility of project work, identity or their own reputation as researchers and experts to be used by policy makers to validate pre-determined policies and approaches.
- Where researchers feel under undue pressure, they should be able to raise this with the project's management team for discussion.
- Task 5.4 should provide a rationale for the audience for policy maker dissemination activities that takes these concerns into account.
- Policy maker dissemination from PACE should be transparent.
- Task 4.4's selection of methods for scenario planning should explicitly consider the extent to which is it appropriate to imagine a focal point or 'client' for the scenario research. The selection of methods should consider which methods are explicitly normative (imagine a desired political end-state) and which are more open, and potentially usable by a greater range of actors.
- PACE partners who might themselves be an audience for policy recommendations arising from the project's research work should identify the issues which they are interested in exploring.

- When planning policy maker dissemination, partners should consider the ability to have early stage researchers to present our research, supported as appropriate by more established researchers.
- PACE should identify how senior researchers, with an existing public profile, and can support more junior voices in becoming involved in the policy recommendations process.
- We need to be well aware of the existing policy recommendations in this domain, and have a considered and evidence-based assessment of their suitability. For example, based on our evidence around the causes of populism, would we believe such strategies likely to be successful (either on their own terms or against some other appropriate criteria for success that accords with our ethical principles)?
- PACE should consider and evaluate existing problematisations of populism and consider the extent to which we are able to accept these, even if in a qualified form.
- PACE should agree and document a clear perspective on what the project considers the negative impacts of populist politics to be.
  - The project should remain aware that even this is a political decision, even if we aim for one that is acceptable to the largest number of actors, and accords with our agreed ethical principles, it should be open to discussion.
  - Can we identify any "negative impacts of populism" where there is likely to be large-scale agreement that this is a negative impact?
- Can PACE identify policy recommendations arising from its work that are likely to received broad support, even within a heavily politicised context?
  - Can the democracy labs provide any insight on this?
- PACE should anticipate significant distrust of its motives and outputs from populist supporters, especially if we are seen as playing an active political role.
- The PACE consortium should consider if it is possible to put our policy recommendations up for public scrutiny in a way that allows the public to ask questions and get answers. This goes beyond the conventional practice of simply publishing our report (a basic requirement).
  - Depending upon timing, is it possible to put any policy recommendations to one or more of the project's democracy labs, or create the opportunity for students to discuss them through the educational outreach and dissemination work?
- Can we find a way to get other experts in the field of populism or our methodological domains to review our policy recommendations? Whilst our research and analytical work is likely to encounter scientific review when put forward for publication, this is much less likely for our policy recommendations unless we take this forward intentionally. Other research projects funded under the same call (POPREBEL, DEMOS) might be suitable candidates for this.

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Crick, Bernard, *In Defence of Politics*, Continuum, London & New York, 2005.

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Saarinen A, Koivula A and Keipi T, "Political trust, political party preference and trust in
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