Date: Thu, 08 Apr 1999 08:48:37 +0200
From: "Gatherer, D. (Derek)" <D.Gatherer@organon.nhe.akzonobel.nl>
Subject: RE: "More Real"
To: "'memetics@mmu.ac.uk'" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
-----Original Message-----
From: konsler@ascat.harvard.edu [mailto:konsler@ascat.harvard.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 1999 5:04 PM
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: "More Real"
Reed:
It would be a principle of memetics that memes are entities
with a real material structure, wouldn't it? I think to question
that hypothesis would undo the endeavor completely.
Derek:
I think that the strict Dawkins B school, ie. those that regard memes as
neural configurations, are the 'most' materialist in this sense.
Externalists (or rather anti-internalists) like me are also materialists in
that we see memes as having a real material structure when they are
artefacts etc. It becomes a bit more difficult when we are refering to
behaviours, as these may only have a transient manifestation. There is also
a variant of Dawkins B which is less materialist in that it sees memes as
not necessarily having any hard-wired neural structure but nevertheless
being 'in the head' in some sense.
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