Message-Id: <35E3CF9D.4487EB71@mmu.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1998 10:04:29 +0100
From: Bruce Edmonds <b.edmonds@mmu.ac.uk>
To: jom-emit-ann@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: New paper: Why the `Thought Contagion' Metaphor is Retarding the Progress of Memetics - Derek Gatherer
Why the `Thought Contagion'
Metaphor is Retarding the
Progress of Memetics
Derek Gatherer
Abstract
The most generally accepted definition of the meme,
as a `unit of information residing in a brain'
(Dawkins 1982), implies a meme-host duality which
is the basis of many current developments in
memetics, in particular the notion that the passage of
such memes (or homoderivative mnemons, following
Lynch 1998) from mind to mind constitutes a process
that may be considered as `thought contagion'. A
critique of religious belief and other non-rational
systems of thought, as `mind viruses'
(Dawkins 1993), has been built upon such a
meme-host duality. This paper provides two
objections to the `thought contagion'/`mind virus'
theory: a) that the concept of a transmitted belief, as
opposed to transmitted information, is highly
problematic, and b) that in any case the concept of a
meme-host duality is equally suspect. It is suggested
that the least philosophically problematic constitution
for a science of memetics would be to adopt a
behaviourist stance towards memes, to restrict the use
of the term to those replicating cultural phenomena
which can be directly observed or measured (Benzon
1996). This would release us from the difficulties of
the indefinable meme-host relationship, and also have
the merit of making memetics more directly
comparable to animal behavioural ecology, to the
existing branch of social psychology known as social
contagion theory, and to the sociological field of
empirical diffusion studies.
Key words: meme, belief, religion, linguistic
behaviourism, mind virus, thought contagion, social
contagion, diffusion of innovations.
Available at URL:
http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/1998/vol2/gatherer_d.html