Message-Id: <3.0.1.32.19980417153231.00aa7360@popmail.mcs.net>
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 1998 15:32:31 -0500
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: Aaron Lynch <aaron@mcs.net>
Subject: Re: memetics-digest V1 #26: metabeliefs
In-Reply-To: <s53798d4.052@corel.ie>
Adrian,
>> ...you can't possibly be *mistaken* about what you believe at a given
>>moment..
I suppose "confused" or "conflicted" would be better words. I agree that
studying conflict/confusion within the individual is not as central to
memetics as studying conflicts/confusions at the population level. Memetics
is not intended to replace psychology and cognitive science.
>It was I who made the statements (I think) you're referring to....
>
>Belief is complex and people may irrationally hold contradictory opinions.
>Also they may frequently revise their beliefs based on reflection alone,
>i.e. without external events warranting it. Nevertheless, I don't think any
>possible judge could actually say someone is incorrect in saying they
>believe something, regardless of how irrational or how fleeting it might
>be.
>
>Surveys occasionally allow respondants to select from a list of replies to
>a given question (Do you feel *very strongly, *quite strongly, *fairly
>strongly or *not strongly at all...etc.), scoring the replies with
strength of
>opinion, but its questionable (to me at any rate) if the answers are a
>much more accurate a reflection of 'how people really feel'.
>The assumption that the number of uncommitted individuals on either side
>of an issue is in proportion to the overall level of support is often
>dubious. This is an issue political polling doesn't have to contend with -
>you only get one vote no matter how committed you are, though pollsters
>sometimes qualify their results with comments about turnout rates, the
>weather (in Europe anyway) etc.
>
>I think this might be a refinement to add to a developed memetics rather
>than something to address now, though. Mapping respondents' replies to
>yes (for positive yes replies) or no (for anyone else), an effective
>consequence (see note) of using Aaron Lynch's notation, makes
>analysis much more feasible and also the analogies drawn between
>memetics and epidemiology, population genetics etc possible.
>Finally, once a survey has been performed, it can always be checked if
>the frequency of expression of a given mnemon and its compliment are in
>proportion to the measured host levels - if not, its reasonable
>(sometimes) to assume one side are more enthusiastic than the other
>and qualify results accordingly.
>
>Adrian
>
>Note: You can of course map mnemon-identifiers to points on a scale
>allowing opinions across a spectrum to be reflected with arbitrary
>accuracy (A='Between 0 & 1', B='Between 1 & 2' etc).
>
The symbolic and event notation does cover more than just yes/no on a
topic. It does so by letting A, B, C, etc correspond to very strong
agreement, strong agreement, agreement, etc., or the "0 < x < 1" etc.
measurements. For a paragraph about this, search for the word "continuum"
in section 16 of my paper.
Still, this does not necessarily capture how people feel. Instead, the main
population memetic questions involve measuring event rates for various
memes. Answering the question of how well something propagates does not
tell us everything interesting about a meme, such as what it really feels
like to believe.
>
>>>> Eva-Lise Carlstrom <eva-lise@efn.org> 04/16/98 07:26pm >>>
>aron Lynch responds to Adrian Kelleher, 14 April 98:
>
>> >>If you want to raise questions about validity of individual claims,
>then
>> >>you might as well also doubt whether the person has the meme he
>> >claims to
>> >>have.
>> >
>> >By 'claims', I meant that I may claim to have been decisively
>influenced by
>> >my father in accepting Zen Buddism, but perhaps I am mistaken in the
>> >assertion. Here, I'm making a claim about an objective *fact*. This is
>not
>> >the same as doubting someone has the meme he claims to have - you
>> >can't possibly be *mistaken* about what you believe at a given
>moment..
>
>I agree with Aaron that doubting someone's assertion about where they
>got
>a meme is not on the same level as doubting their assertion that they
>have
>that meme. However, I don't think it's as clear as he seems to think
>that one cannot be mistaken about one's own beliefs. Since beliefs are
>not
>digital units, but involve many factors including degrees of understanding
>and conviction, it is perfectly possible, for instance, to state with no
>intention of deceit that one believes something to be true, but also to
>act in ways derived from contradictory beliefs. By adding "at a given
>moment", Aaron probably means to avoid this kind of fuzzy case, but I
>don't think that does the trick, as even "one's beliefs at a given moment"
>are not a completely discrete set that can be guaranteed
>clear and non-contradictory. See Dennett's multiple-drafts model of
>consciousness, as laid out in _Consciousness Explained_, for a
>description
>of how a person's belief set might not be as clear-cut as Aaron's remark
>would have it.
>
>--Eva-Lise Carlstrom
>
>
>
>===============================================================
>This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
>Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
>For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
>see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
>===============================================================
>This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
>Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
>For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
>see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
--Aaron Lynch
http://www.mcs.net/~aaron/thoughtcontagion.html
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit