Date: Tue, 17 Jun 1997 01:16:13 -0400
From: Dr I Price <PEWLEYFORT@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: Memetics vs. History of Ideas
To: "INTERNET:memetics@mmu.ac.uk" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
Mark
Thank you for a clear, well reasoned and lucid contribution to the ongoin=
g
discussion here.
--------
>This [Shai's original question] is an important question, one that will
have to be answered credibly
if memetics is every to be taken seriously. The question really deals wi=
th
the issues of epistemology and ontology. Does memetics use a different
epistemology and ontology than classical historical theory? Does this n=
ew
epistemology offer any advantages?
Setting aside the question of memetic's utility for a moment, let me poin=
t
out the difficulties facing any epistemological change. Epistemological
change presents a number of difficulties. How does one communicate a ne=
w
ontology when the listening of the receiver is a filter than only hears
confirmation of the existing internal ontology? How does one communicate=
a
new epistemology when the receiver's existing epistemology resorts to
magical explanations of conflicts in observable evidence? How does a new=
epistemology overcome the agents (people, institutions, artifacts)
maintaining the existing ontology?>
----------------end quote--------------------
Does it help if we see the agents maintaining both existing ontology and
existing epistemology as the meme's themselves. This - shades of the free=
will debate I know - is my reading of the Dawkins. Dennet position.
Curiously I find it enhances a sense of choice if we can view
epistemologies/ ontologies less as 'right' or 'wrong' and more as areas
where we have a choice.
------------------start quote--------------------
>I'll frame my response to your question in the light of epistemological
change to explain my understanding of the current debate over defining wh=
at
a 'meme' actually represents. There are those that liken it to 'a unit o=
f
replication,' 'a unit of communication,' 'a virus,' 'a brain parasite,'
'replicating idea,' and a host of other metaphors. Each of these has
their own merits, but they are only metaphors, individual words. The key=
to understanding the intellectual dialog is an understanding of the battl=
e
between epistemologies.
SNIP
I need to expand on Dennett's use of the word 'replicators' in the last
sentence. As we have seen in recent posts here, the word 'replicator' is=
vague and easily interpreted to mean conflicting things. To clarify what=
Dennett is getting at, I'll assume he is saying memes are like genes exce=
pt
in different media. Thus, the term 'code-recording-objects' can replace
'replicator.'>
--------------end quote------------
Can it that's the [actually a] question.
My understanding of the replicator position is that it is founded in the
chemical structure of DNA. Put a strip of double helix in the right conte=
xt
[nutrients and cell] and it will unzip then make two copies from each
original strand. Sorry if this is overly simplistic. I make no claim to b=
e
a hand's on trained geneticist.
But - if the ' unzip - two zip ' operation happens then surely DNA does
more than simply record code, doesn't it?
I do not BTW see this as weakening your call for a better physical
understanding of the hypothetical process of meme replication, nor your
position concerning the potential benefits, especially
>>>1. New insights into the relationship between language and history.
Language preserves a great deal of 'old code.' We will be able to look
back into deep human history (potentially a million years) through lingui=
st
analysis in the same way astronomers look at the big bang via ancient lig=
ht
just now reaching earth.>>>>
Maybe as Bill B said 50-100k maximum, but yes in principle.
>>>>To conclude, I will have to repeat my assertion that memes are object=
s
with
a stable and identifiable shape in time and space. It is only by honorin=
g
physical analogy between memes and genes that we are likely to make the
epistemological change and thus improve our perspective. >>>>
I think I am more concerned with the process analogy, or the physical
explanation of the process analogy. If a class of replicators has emerged=
which do not require so much [any?] physical existence outside their host=
's
heads so what. Why is this not simply a neat trick in replicator space?<
If Price
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