Message-Id: <l03020900afc33bbb3696@[142.104.18.102]>
In-Reply-To: <199706100618_MC2-182F-47A3@compuserve.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 1997 10:45:52 -0700
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: Toby Foshay <tfoshay@uvic.ca>
Subject: challenge?
>TP wrote
>
>>I might add one more comment. In several of my postings, I have been
>>challenging memetics to define itself in relationship to a known and
>>ancient history of philosophy. I just did so again, this time by asking a
>>question in ethics.
Paul Marsden replies
[Memetics] is not dualist in Platonic or Cartesian or any other forms - it
>is monist. Nor is memetics idealist
>because it posits an empirical and material world of objects.
In light of Timothy Perper's challenge I find it curious that my posting on
mimetics/memetics of a few days ago has gone without comment.
Paul Marsden's assertion that memetics is not dualist is philosophically
highly questionable. Insofar as it is realist and empiricist it is, as I
suggested in my former posting, caught in a dialectical relation with
idealism, one that assumes that a "material world of objects" is observable
as such and not always already constructed by our intellectual and
appetitive predispositions. This can hardly be asserted without careful
argument.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"Cyberspace is an accident of the real." - Paul Virilio
Toby Foshay Phone: 250.995.3043
2-652 Moss St. (Office) 250.721.7251
Victoria, B.C. Canada V8V 4N6
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